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Preface 
Each year, the Directorate-General for Regional Policy and Cohesion of the European 
Commission launches a number of studies in the field of regional policy and regional planning. 
These studies mainly aim at providing a basis for policy formulation internally, as well as the pre-
paration of programmes and initiatives and a basis for analysing the impact of current or planned 
activities. The most interesting or innovative of these are published in a series entitled Regional 
development studies. 
With this series, the Directorate-General hopes to stimulate discussion and action in a wider 
sphere on the research results received. The publication of the studies is addressed to politicians 
and decision-makers at European, regional and local level, as well as to academics and experts 
in the broad fields of issues covered. 
It Is hoped that by publicizing research results the Commission will enrich and stimulate public 
debate and promote a further exchange of knowledge and opinions on the issues which are 
considered important for the economic and social cohesion of the Union and therefore for the 
furure of Europe. 
Readers should bear in mind that the study reports do not necessarily reflect the Official position 
of the Commission but first and foremost express the opinion of those responsible for carrying 
out the study. 

Foreword 
This report is based upon the results of a study undertaken by the Groupe de recherche européen sur les 
milieux innovateurs (GREMÌ) under the direction of Professor Roberto Camagni and Professor Michel Quevit, 
and involving national research teams in Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece.1 Comparative research 
was also undertaken in the USA. The original report set out to examine the economic performance of the 
Community's lagging regions in recent years, the impact of European integration on these regions and the 
effectiveness of regional policy initiatives at the national and Community level. In particular, the original study 
set out to examine the policy implications of adopting an approach in terms of local 'milieux' and innovation 
networks. This report updates the original GREMÌ report by including Eurostat data, which" were not available at 
the time, and expanding the analysis. 
The production of this document has benefited greatly from discussion and debate between the research 
team and the Scientific Committee acting on behalf of the Directorate-General for Regional Policy. Particular 
thanks are therefore due to the members of that Committee: Professor K. Allen, Professor 
J. Goddard, Professor P. Van Rompuy and Professor R. Velasco. 
1 R. Camagni and M. Quévit, Development prospects of the Community's lagging 
regions and the socio-economic consequences of the completion of the internal 
market; an approach in terms of local milieux and innovation networks, 1992. 
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Executive summary 
Main aim of the report Diverging and converging regions 
1. The report analyses the economic performance 
of the Objective 1 regions in the 1980s and makes 
an assessment of the impact of 1992 on these 
regions. 
2. The performance of Objective 1 regions was 
diverse. Indeed, a broad trend was towards greater 
heterogeneity amongst the group of lagging 
regions. Thus some regions are catching up, some 
are falling still further behind (see Table 1). 
Table 1 : The performance of Objective 1 regions in the 1980s 
Member 
State 
Italy 
UK 
Ireland 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
France 
Converging 
regions 
Abruzzi 
Molise 
All regions 
East. Macedonia 
Ionian Isles 
S. Aegean Isles 
Crete 
Andalucía 
Castilla La Mancha 
Murcia 
Canarias 
Valencia 
Lisboa 
Norte 
Mixed evidence 
regions 
Puglia 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
Northern Ireland 
Galicia 
Castilla Leon 
Extremadura 
Algarve 
Centro 
Alentejo 
Diverging 
regions 
Basilicata 
Campania 
Calabria 
Cent. Macedonia 
Attica 
Cent. Greece 
West. Greece 
Epirus 
N. Aegean Isles 
West. Macedonia 
Thessalya 
Peleponnese 
Asturias 
Corsica 
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3. In terms of competitive performance in the 
1980s, the lagging regions can be classified under 
four headings. 
• Relatively few regions, even among the conver­
ging regions, showed strong signs of enjoying a vir­
tuous growth cycle of increasing productivity and 
employment (NE quadrant in Figure 1). 
• Many regions, often those classified as conver­
ging regions, were forced into drastic rationalization 
of productive capacity. This resulted in good pro­
ductivity growth, but at the expense of falling 
employment and rapidly rising unemployment (NW 
quadrant). 
• The largest number of lagging regions are fol­
lowing a sheltered development trajectory, storing 
up problems for the future. These are regions which 
failed to modernize their economy (low productivity 
growth), but were able to maintain or increase 
employment levels, often as a result of explicit or 
implicit policies of assistance or protection (SE 
quadrant). 
• A small group of regions, finally, seems to have 
entered a vicious cycle or de­industrialization, where 
employment cuts and closures are unable to restore 
competitiveness and job losses continue (SW 
quadrant). 
4. There is a risk that the regions in the vicious cycle 
group (and in a later stage perhaps also some of 
the regions in the sheltered development group) 
would not be able to find a place in the international 
division of labour and drop out of the international 
economy completely. Their survival will then depend 
almost entirely on income transfers from economi­
cally stronger regions in the same Member State or 
from other Member States. 
Explaining differences 
in economic performance 
5. Obviously, national factors play a major role in 
determining inter­regional disparity; the generally 
good performance of Irish regions and the generally 
bad performance of Greek regions can be put down 
to their relative macroeconomic policies. Sound 
macro­economic policies and investment in infra­
structure are undoubtedly essential for long­term 
regional development. It should be noted that all 
Objective 1 regions still have important infrastructur­
al gaps; this has usually hindered, but not always 
prevented, development. 
6. However, there is diversity of performance within 
the same macroeconomic context; even within 
poorly performing regions there may be some local 
success stories. Nor is good infrastructure a gua­
rantee of success. The best that can be said is that 
the lack of infrastructure and a bad macro­econ­
omic context hinder development. Even then, there 
Figure 1 : Regional growth patterns of the Objective 1 regions, 1980­88 
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are examples of success in regions with poor infra-
structure (e.g. Ireland) or with a poor macro-econ-
omic environment (e.g. Crete). There is undoubtedly 
more to development than just infrastructure and 
macro-economics. Therefore, a 'bad' national 
context does not condemn regions to underdeve-
lopment. At the same time, this stresses the impor-
tance of decentralization of decision-making power, 
especially in countries where the national economic 
environment is poor. 
7. The routes to success are varied; tourism has 
been important in the Balearios, industry in Abruzzi. 
For both regions and local successes the task is 
therefore to identify common factors behind suc-
cess to see if they can be reproduced elsewhere. 
Traditional theoretical explanations for success are 
considered. A review of the literature and a statisti-
cal analysis carried out in this study suggests that 
there is no conclusive evidence in support of any 
particular theory: for each case that fits one theory, 
other cases can be found that clearly contradict the 
theory. 
8. From this statistical analysis of regional economic 
structure and its relationship to performance, a 
number of conclusions can be drawn. Structural 
factors did not provide a statistically significant 
explanation of the performance of each region; cor-
relation and regression analyses confirmed that 
structural factors may explain the level of regional 
GDP, but not the growth rate. The presence of a 
single asset or benefit does not in itself encourage 
or prevent development. Thus, good road infra-
structure, a highly qualified labour force or low 
labour costs did not automatically lead to a good 
local performance. At the same time, a peripheral 
location, or agricultural specialization did not in 
themselves prevent development opportunities. 
9. The absence of an explanation based on the tra-
ditional theories necessitates an examination of 
more unconventional approaches which emphasize 
the less tangible development factors, factors which 
are often difficult to measure and quantify. The 
study examined the concept of 'milieu innovateur'. 
An innovative milieu is defined as the set of relation-
ships occurring within a geographical area which 
bring unity to a production system, economic 
actors, and an industrial culture, generating a local-
ized dynamic process of 'collective learning' and 
acting as an uncertainty-reducing mechanism in the 
innovation process. The model is an endogenous 
growth one, in that it emphasizes the local frame-
work. Specialization is the key, leading to high 
synergy in the regional economy. 
10. The more conventional factors such as edu-
cation and infrastructure are still important in this 
story (indeed, the abundance of skills is possibly 
crucial). But the coherency of the regional economy 
and intangible factors such as informal networks are 
also part of the explanation for economic success. 
Therein lies the attractiveness of the model; not only 
can the processes outlined in the model be obser-
ved in parts of Italy and elsewhere in the EC, but 
also an explanation is provided for the lack of auto-
matic linkage between success and single factors 
such as infrastructure. The important thing is not 
any single feature of the economy, but that it forms 
a coherent whole. 
11. Innovative milieux do exist in Objective 1 
regions, but they are rare and incipient. The macro-
economic context and local framework affects their 
development (e.g. the backwardness of the social 
environment in Greece and the relative absence of 
local entrepreneurship and synergy in Ireland). Inno-
vative milieux were found within converging and 
mixed evidence regions. Encouragingly, some 
milieux were present in diverging regions. There is 
therefore material for policy to build on. Provided 
that they are exploited coherently, some seemingly 
negative factors can play a positive role. For 
example, a peripheral location can have advantages 
for environmental protection and possible tourist 
development. 
12. The fact that local resources are utilized in the 
development of an innovative milieu does not mean 
that the process can only start as a product of In-
digenous entrepreneurship. The catalyst for many 
local success stories in central Italy, for example, 
was an external firm setting up to take advantage of 
the skills already there. However, if external invest-
ment is attracted to a region, it has to link up with 
elements other than a cheap labour force or an un-
spoilt environment if a self-sustaining development 
process is to emerge. A link with an external dy-
namic is crucial even in cases where the develop-
ment process is started by indigenous entrepre-
neurship. The potential for continued development 
relying solely on local· capabilities is limited in the 
long run. Cooperation with external institutions, 
firms or research centres is important, as is the 
importance of the external dynamic for product and 
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market diversification, in order to continually recrea-
te local competitiveness and innovative capacity. 
This is even more important in lagging regions 
where conditions for the generation of local innova-
tive milieux are weak. 
The impact of European integration 
13. There is a diversity of experience in the different 
regions. Contrary to what is sometimes argued, 
sensitive sectors2 are strongly represented in some 
lagging regions, while in others their share of total 
employment is minimal. 
14. The industrial structure of the Objective 1 re-
gional economies differs from that of the more 
developed Member States. In particular, Portugal 
and Greece are less well integrated and rely upon 
inter-industry specialization in labour intensive, low 
technology sectors. 
15. The likely impact of 1992 upon Greek and Por-
tuguese regions is to encourage further inter-indus-
try specialization in sectors such as textiles, clothing 
and footwear. In the short term this may have 
advantages, but in the longer term these sectors 
will be subject to competition from developing 
countries and future adjustment costs will be high. 
There is therefore a need to modernize the Object-
ive 1 economies, with large scale investments 
needed to close infrastructure and knowledge gaps 
and thus enable the upgrading of their economies 
and a move towards an intra-industry development 
scenario. One problem is that the scale of the 
investment needed might not be forthcoming from 
national sources in a transition period, due to the 
disciplines imposed by monetary union. 
Policy implications 
16. From a Community regional policy point of view, 
the main challenge of the 1990s is to maintain the 
momentum of convergence in the successful 
regions and to 'turn round' the situation in the sta-
tionary or diverging regions. 
17. Given that there are no standard policy recipes 
on offer, the fundamental aim of EC policy must be 
2 'Sensitive sectors' are sectors which are currently protected by non-tariff 
barriers or where barriers prevent the exploitation of economies of scale or 
where barriers allow the retention of price dicrepancies between Member 
States. It Is thought that these sectors would be particulary 'sensitive' to the 
completion of the internal market when such barriers are removed. 
to advise, encourage and warn. To advise, first of 
all, on the lessons of successful experience else-
where, on the creation or consolidation of technical 
and organizational capabilities at local, regional and 
national levels, and more generally on the effective 
management, piloting and assessment of develop-
ment efforts. Secondly, to encourage the setting of 
clear and transparent goals expressing a credible 
ambition to reduce disparities in specified ways so 
as to prepare for closer economic integration, and 
to provide financial support commensurate with the 
ambition and the practical organization put in place 
to achieve that ambition. To warn finally, those who 
are at risk of diverging and those who are clearly 
diverging, of the likely medium-term consequences 
of a failure to turn round the situation: the risk, in 
short, of a growing dependency on transfers from 
outside. 
18. Regions should ensure that policy success is 
measurable, that results are regularly monitored, 
and that the public and political authorities are regu-
larly informed of progress. A determined effort 
should also be made to inform and involve the pri-
vate sector and general public in the public sectors' 
development policy, and especially to ensure full 
information on the various grant systems or other 
forms of support available. Openness and transpar-
ency are key words for public policy in the 1990s. 
19. Maintaining the momentum of convergence 
implies continued progress towards reducing reli-
ance on lower labour costs and labour-intensive 
production. Regions must progressively establish 
the type of intra-industry specialization typical of 
more advanced countries, and develop advanced 
niches within their traditional sectors. The same 
approach applies to specialization in markets ser-
vices, tourism in particular. Unit labour cost advan-
tages should be maintained through productivity 
increases rather than through wage compression. 
This represents a major challenge for the lagging 
regions, because, to make significant progress 
towards closing the development gap, they will not 
have to 'run as fast as, but twice as fast as' the 
economically most prosperous regions. 
20. Not all regions will be able to develop capabi-
lities for innovation from internal resources. For this 
second category of regions, emphasis must be put 
on external investment as the main catalyst for local 
economic development. Such a policy will need to 
be based on a realistic and objective analysis of the 
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attractiveness of the region concerned to external 
Investors, and steps should be taken to improve the 
attractiveness in consequence. Moreover, for this to 
be successful as a means of stimulating local de-
velopment, determined attempts must be made to 
deliberately embed external investment into the 
local environment. 
21. A theme of growing importance should be the 
provision of information. Information is one of the 
key factors in creating Interaction between local and 
external economic forces; in networking between 
firms and institutions, and more generally in suc-
cessfully adapting to changing markets and techno-
logical environments. How information provision and 
interchange is organized and provided are vital 
questions in the development process. There is a 
role for specialized intermediaries to play, helping to 
put Individuals, firms and institutions in contact with 
appropriate information. There ¡s a role for the use of 
technology to provide and access information. 
22. Secondly, regions need to reinforce their efforts 
to develop human capabilities in two ways. First 
there is a need to upgrade the skills and abilities 
within a region at all levels. Second, there is a need 
to improve the training of those individuals who will 
act as intermediaries or development agents. The 
letter's proactive role within a regional economy is, 
in any approach, aiming to influence the prevailing 
entrepreneurial culture, one of the main agents of 
change. 
training. What must be avoided above all, is to 
encourage a form of sheltered development, isola-
ted from market realities, or, worst of all, to permit 
by means of progressively greater financial trans-
fers,' a rising standard of living despite a diminishing 
level of productive activity due to an unwillingness 
to change out-dated and inappropriate economic 
and social practices. 
23. Thirdly, the institutional framework within which 
policy is designed and implemented needs to be 
decentralized, coordinated but flexible. In many 
regions, this framework may not exist and it is diffi-
cult to create de novo. A major task will therefore be 
to ensure that an effective and decentralized net-
work of regional institutions exists, particularly in 
those countries where decision-making is highly 
centralized, so that policy can be managed from the 
local level, possibly by a development agency, with 
the active participation of other relevant local actors. 
24. In conclusion, success in an uncertain and fast-
changing world is determined by a high level of 
Information, widely shared, a high level of skill 
attainment, a prevailing entrepreneurial culture, and 
a well-organized institutional framework. These are 
the qualities that development policies should seek 
to promote going beyond meeting basic require-
ments for infrastructures, education and vocational 
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Résumé 
PRESENTATION SUCCINCTE 
Finalité principale du rapport 
1. Le rapport analyse les performances économiques 
respectives des régions de l'objectif n° 1 dans les 
années 80 et ¡I en évalue les retombées en 1992. 
Régions divergentes et régions convergentes 
2. Les résultats obtenus au regard de l'objectif n° 1 ont 
varié d'une région à l'autre. La tendance lourde atteste 
une hétérogénéité accrue dans le groupe des régions 
en retard de développement. Autrement dit, certaines 
régions comblent en partie leur retard alors que d'autres 
sont de plus en plus distancées (voir tableau 1). 
Tableau 1 
État 
membre 
Italie 
Royaume 
Irlande 
Grèce 
Espagne 
Portugal 
France 
-Uni 
performance des régions de 
Régions 
convergentes 
Abruzzes 
Molise 
Toutes régions 
Macédoine orientale 
îles Ioniennes 
îles du sud de la mer 
Crète 
Andalousie 
Castille-La Manche 
Murcie 
Canaries 
Valence 
Lisbonne 
Nord 
Egée 
'objectif n° 1 dans les années 80 
Réglons 
mixtes 
Pouilles 
Sicile 
Sardalgne 
Irlande du Nord 
Réglons 
divergentes 
Basilicate 
Campanie 
Calabre 
Macédoine centrale 
Attlque 
Grèce centrale 
Grèce occidentale 
Épire 
îles du nord de la mer Egée 
Macédoine occidentale 
Thessalie 
Péloponnèse 
Galice 
Castille-León 
Estrémadure 
Algarve 
Centre 
Alentejo 
Asturies 
Corse 
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3. Si l'on se réfère à la compétitivité au cours des 
années 80, les réglons en retard peuvent être clas­
sées sous quatre rubriques. 
• Relativement rares sont les régions, y compris 
parmi les régions convergentes, où l'on a pu voir 
des signes manifestes attestant un cycle de crois­
sance vertueuse, dans lequel la progression de la 
productivité va de pair avec celle de l'emploi (quart 
nord­est de la figure 1). 
• Nombre de régions ­ d'ailleurs souvent classées 
parmi les régions convergentes ­ ont dû procéder à 
une rationalisation impitoyable de leur capacité de 
production, d'où une croissance satisfaisante de la 
productivité, obtenue au prix de réductions d'effectifs 
et d'une croissance rapide du chômage (quart nord­
ouest). 
• La plupart des régions en retard se développent 
dans un contexte de protection artificielle, ce qui 
recèle des problèmes pour l'avenir. Il s'agit de 
régions qui ne sont pas parvenues à moderniser 
leur économie (faible croissance de la productivité), 
mais qui, souvent, n'ont pu maintenir ou accroître 
l'emploi que grâce à des mesures d'aide ou de pro­
tection explicites ou implicites (quart sud­est). 
• Enfin, un petit groupe de régions semblent être 
entrées dans une spirale de déclin ou de désindus­
trialisation, en ce sens que les diminutions d'effec­
tifs et les fermetures d'entreprises ne permettent 
pas de restaurer la compétitivité et que l'érosion de 
l'emploi s'y poursuit (quart sud­ouest). 
4. Il n'est pas exclu que les régions appartenant à la 
quatrième des catégories précitées (et peut­être ulté­
rieurement quelques­unes aussi des régions relevant 
de la troisième de ces catégories) se révèlent hors 
d'état de trouver leur place dans la division Internatio­
nale du travail et se voient totalement exclues de 
l'économie internationale. Leur survie serait alors 
presque entièrement tributaire de transferts écono­
miques en provenance de régions plus prospères du 
même État membre ou d'autres États membres. 
Explication des différences 
en matière de performance économique 
5. Il est manifeste que les facteurs nationaux jouent 
un rôle considérable en matière de disparités entre 
réglons: si, en général, les résultats se révèlent 
bons dans les régions irlandaises et médiocres 
dans les régions grecques, on peut y voir une cor­
rélation avec les politiques macro­économiques 
nationales respectives. À noter que toutes les 
régions de l'objectif n° 1 accusent encore des 
retards importants en ce qui concerne les infra­
structures et que ces retards ont le plus souvent, 
mais pas toujours, entravé le développement. 
6. Il reste que les résultats obtenus peuvent varier 
dans le même contexte macro­économique: même 
dans des régions faibles, il peut y avoir de brillantes 
réussites à l'échelon local; Inversement, l'existence 
d'une bonne infrastructure ne garantit pas le suc­
Figure 1 ­ Représentation de la croissance dans les régions de l'objectif n° 1 (1980­1988) 
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ces. Tout ce que l'on peut dire, c'est que le manque 
d'Infrastructures et un mauvais environnement 
macro-économique entravent le développement, 
encore que l'on puisse citer des exemples de réus-
sites dans des régions mal pourvues en infrastruc-
tures (en Irlande) ou pâtissant d'un environnement 
macro-économique médiocre (en Crète). Il est cer-
tain que le développement ne dépend pas unique-
ment de l'infrastructure et des facteurs macro-éco-
nomiques. C'est pourquoi un «mauvais» contexte 
national ne condamne pas au sous-développement 
les régions concernées. Les observations qui précè-
dent illustrent bien l'Importance que revêt la décen-
tralisation du pouvoir décisionnel, en particulier là où 
l'environnement économique national est médiocre. 
7. Différents itinéraires peuvent mener au succès; 
c'est ainsi que le tourisme a joué un rôle Important 
aux Baléares et l'Industrie dans les Abruzzes. Qu'il 
s'agisse des réglons ou des réussites locales, il faut 
donc identifier les facteurs communs expliquant tel 
ou tel succès et se demander s'ils sont reproduc-
tibles ailleurs. Les explications théoriques fournies en 
la matière ne sont pas perdues de vue; si l'on exa-
mine la littérature spécialisée et l'analyse statistique 
figurant dans dans la présente étude, on ne voit 
aucun élément probant attestant le bien-fondé de 
telle ou telle théorie: pour un cas qui valide une théo-
rie, on peut en citer plusieurs autres qui l'invalident. 
8. Quelques conclusions peuvent être tirées de la pré-
sente analyse statistique de la structure économique 
régionale et de la corrélation existant entre celle-ci et 
les résultats obtenus. Les facteurs structurels n'ont 
pas permis d'expliquer de manière statistiquement 
significative la performance de chaque région; quant 
aux analyses de corrélation et de régression, elles ont 
confirmé que les facteurs structurels peuvent expliquer 
le niveau du PIB régional, mais pas le taux de crois-
sance. En soi, l'existence de tel ou tel atout, de tel ou 
tel avantage, ne favorise ni n'empêche le développe-
ment. C'est ainsi qu'une bonne infrastructure routière, 
la disponibilité d'une main-d'œuvre hautement qualifiée 
ou le faible coût-horaire du travail n'ont pas automati-
quement débouché sur de bons résultats à l'échelon 
local. À l'inverse, une situation excentrée ou une spé-
cialisation agricole n'ont pas constitué intrinsèquement 
des freins au développement. 
9. L'absence d'explication fondée sur les théories 
traditionnelles oblige à examiner des approches 
moins conventionnelles mettant l'accent sur des fac-
teurs de développement' moins tangibles et, par là 
même, souvent difficiles à mesurer et à quantifier. 
L'étude a porté en partie sur la notion de «milieu 
innovateur», par quoi l'on entend l'ensemble des 
relations qui, sur un territoire donné, fonctionnent 
comme un facteur d'unité au bénéfice d'un système 
de production, des acteurs économiques et d'une 
culture industrielle, ce qui déclenche localement un 
processus dynamique d'«apprentissage collectif» et 
qui allège le poids des incertitudes propres à inhiber 
l'innovation. Il s'agit là d'un modèle de croissance 
endogène, en ce sens qu'il met l'accent sur le cadre 
local. La spécialisation est l'élément capital, aboutis-
sant à une forte synergie dans l'économie régionale. 
10. Les facteurs plus classiques, tels que l'éduca-
tion et l'infrastructure, continuent en l'occurrence de 
jouer un rôle important (et même vital lorsqu'il s'agit 
des compétences auxquelles on peut faire appel). Il 
n'en demeure pas moins que la cohérence de 
l'économie régionale et des facteurs intangibles tels 
que les réseaux informels expliquent eux aussi, en 
partie, les résultats économiques. Là réside l'intérêt 
du modèle, intéressant en ce sens que les proces-
sus cernés dans le modèle peuvent être observés 
ici et là en Italie et ailleurs dans la Communauté 
européenne, mais aussi qu'il fournit une explication 
quant à l'absence de corrélation automatique entre 
la réussite et divers facteurs tels que l'infrastructure. 
Ce qui importe, ce n'est pas tel ou tel aspect de 
l'économie, mais sa cohérence globale. 
11. Les milieux innovateurs existent assurément 
dans les régions de l'objectif n° 1, mais ils sont 
rares et encore peu implantés. Le contexte macro-
économique et l'environnement local retentissent 
sur leur développement (voir l'arriération de l'envi-
ronnement social en Grèce et le relatif effacement 
des dirigeants d'entreprise locaux ainsi que le faible 
degré de synergie en Irlande). Ces milieux innova-
teurs se rencontrent tant dans les régions conver-
gentes que dans les régions «mixtes», et quelques-
uns aussi, ce qui est encourageant, dans les 
régions divergentes. Autrement dit, il existe une 
base sur laquelle peut s'appuyer la politique à 
mettre en œuvre. Pourvu qu'on sache en tirer parti, 
certains facteurs apparemment négatifs peuvent 
jouer un rôle 'positif. À titre d'exemple, une situation 
excentrée peut présenter des avantages en ce qui 
concerne la protection de l'environnement et les 
possibilités de développement touristique. 
12. Le fait que des ressources locales soient utilisées 
pour développer un milieu innovateur ne signifie pas 
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que le déclenchement du processus doive nécessai-
rement émaner du tissu entrepreneurial indigène. 
C'est ainsi que bon nombre de réussites locales enre-
gistrées en Italie centrale ont été catalysées par l'éta-
blissement d'une firme extérieure à la région, dési-
reuse de bénéficier des compétences existant sur 
place. Toutefois, si une région attire un Investissement 
extérieur, l'existence d'une main-d'œuvre bon marché 
ou d'un environnement intact n'est pas suffisante pour 
amorcer un processus de développement durable. 
Une dynamique externe est absolument indispen-
sable, même dans les cas où le tissu entrepreneurial 
Indigène est à l'origine du processus de développe-
ment. Un développement qui serait entièrement tribu-
taire de capacités locales trouverait fatalement ses 
limites à longue échéance. La coopération avec des 
institutions, des firmes ou des centres de recherche 
extérieurs revêt une grande Importance pour la diver-
sification des produits et des marchés si l'on entend 
que la compétitivité locale et la capacité d'innovation 
ne soient jamais prises en défaut. Cet impératif est 
encore plus prioritaire dans les régions en retard de 
développement offrant des conditions médiocres pour 
la constitution de milieux innovateurs locaux. 
Les effets de l'intégration européenne 
13. La situation varie d'une région à l'autre. Contrai-
rement à ce qui se dit parfois, les secteurs sensi-
bles*1) sont fortement représentés dans certaines 
régions en retard de développement, alors qu'ils ne 
représentent ailleurs qu'une part minime de l'emploi. 
14. La structure industrielle des économies régio-
nales relevant de l'objectif n° 1 diffère de celle qu'on 
trouve dans les États membres plus développés. Le 
Portugal et la Grèce en particulier, moins bien inté-
grés, sont tributaires d'une spécialisation intersec-
torielle à forte intensité de main-d'œuvre et à faible 
contenu technologique. 
15. L'année 1992 aura probablement pour effet 
d'encourager les régions de la Grèce et du Portugal 
à intensifier leur spécialisation dans des secteurs 
tels que le textile-habillement et la chaussure. S'il 
est permis d'escompter des avantages à court 
terme d'une telle évolution, il n'empêche que les 
secteurs en question seront, à plus longue éché-
ance, affrontés à la concurrence des pays en vole 
de développement et que le coût social de l'adap-
tation future sera élevé. Aussi est-il nécessaire de 
moderniser les économies relevant de l'objectif n° 1, 
en réservant les investissements à grande échelle à 
la mise à niveau des infrastructures et au rattrapage 
des retards en matière de connaissances, moyen-
nant quoi les économies en question pourraient pro-
gresser conformément à un scénario de développe-
ment Industriel global. Le problème est que le volume 
de l'Investissement requis peut ne pas correspondre 
aux possibilités des sources de financement natio-
nales dans une période de transition, compte tenu 
des contraintes imposées par l'Union monétaire. 
Conséquences politiques 
16. Au regard de la politique régionale de la Commu-
nauté, le principal défi des années 90 est de mainte-
nir le rythme du processus de convergence dans les 
réglons prospères et d'Inverser la tendance dans les 
réglons qui stagnent ou qui prennent du retard. 
17. Étant donné qu'il n'existe pas de recettes toutes 
faites, la politique de la Communauté européenne 
doit viser avant tout à conseiller, à encourager et à 
mettre en garde. Les conseils prodigués doivent, en 
premier lieu, faire connaître les enseignements tirés 
des succès enregistrés ailleurs, porter sur la création 
et sur la consolidation de capacités techniques et 
organisationnelles aux niveaux local, régional et 
national et, plus généralement, avoir trait aux condi-
tions de l'efficacité quant à la gestion, au pilotage et 
à l'évaluation des actions de développement. Il s'agit 
ensuite d'encourager la définition d'objectifs clairs et 
cohérents exprimant une volonté crédible de réduire 
les disparités selon des modalités déterminées, de 
manière à frayer les voies d'une intégration écono-
mique plus étroite, et de fournir des moyens finan-
ciers qui soient à la mesure de l'ambition affichée et 
de l'organisation pratique mise en place dans cette 
perspective. Il faut enfin mettre en garde les régions 
qui risquent de diverger et celles où le processus de 
divergence est déjà manifeste, en leur exposant les 
conséquences qui résulteraient probablement à 
moyen terme d'une impossibilité de redresser la 
situation, c'est-à-dire en résumé le risque d'être de 
plus en plus tributaires de transferts financiers en 
provenance de l'extérieur. 
18. Il appartient aux régions de faire en sorte que 
l'on puisse mesurer les résultats de la politique mise 
en œuvre, que ces résultats soient contrôlés à inter-
1 On entend par là des secteurs dans lesquels ¡I existe actuellement des 
obstacles non tarifaires assurant une certaine protection, ou d'autres obstacles 
qui empêchent de bénéficier d'économies d'échelle ou qui permettent de 
maintenir des disparités de prix entre États membres. Ces secteurs sont cen&âs 
être particulièrement «sensibles» å l'élimination des obstacles en question, 
inhérente à la réalisation du grand marché. 
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valles réguliers et que la population et les autorités 
politiques soient périodiquement informées des pro-
grès accomplis. De grands efforts s'Imposent éga-
lement en ce qui concerne l'information et la partici-
pation du secteur privé et du grand public quant à 
la politique de développement du secteur public, et 
¡I convient tout particulièrement de veiller à une 
Information exhaustive à propos des divers sys-
tèmes de subventions ou autres types d'aide dispo-
nibles. Ouverture et transparence doivent être les 
mots d'ordre essentiels de la présente décennie. 
19. Si l'on veut maintenir le rythme du processus de 
convergence, ¡I faut s'efforcer de devenir moins tribu-
taire d'une main-d'œuvre à bon marché et d'une 
production à forte intensité de main-d'œuvre. Il 
Importe que les réglons adoptent progressivement le 
type de spécialisation industrielle propre aux pays 
plus avancés et qu'elles développent des créneaux 
d'excellence au sein de leurs secteurs traditionnels. Il 
en va de même de la spécialisation dans diverses 
activités de services, le tourisme en particulier. Mieux 
vaudrait maintenir les avantages inhérents au coût 
unitaire du travail par des gains de productivité que 
par des réductions de salaire. C'est là pour les 
régions en retard de développement un redoutable 
défi, car si elles veulent progresser notablement dans 
la voie du rattrapage, elles devront «courir non pas 
aussi vite, mais deux fois plus vite» que les autres. 
20. Toutes les réglons ne seront pas en mesure de 
se doter de capacités d'innovation en mobilisant uni-
quement leurs propres ressources. Pour les réglons 
concernées, il faudra privilégier l'apport de capitaux 
extérieurs en tant que catalyseur principal du déve-
loppement économique local. Pareille politique devra 
être fondée sur une analyse raisonnable et objective 
de l'attractivité de la région en cause pour les inves-
tisseurs extérieurs et il conviendra de prendre les ini-
tiatives éventuellement nécessaires pour améliorer 
comme il convient les attraits de la région. Si l'on 
veut réussir à stimuler le développement économique 
local en utilisant cette méthode, il faudra, de surcroît, 
avoir la volonté d'insérer harmonieusement l'Investis-
sement extérieur dans le contexte local. 
21. L'information est un thème appelé à prendre de 
plus en plus d'importance; elle est un des facteurs 
déterminants pour susciter une interaction entre 
forces économiques locales et extérieures, pour 
établir un réseau de relations entre entreprises et 
institutions et, plus généralement, pour promouvoir 
avec succès l'adaptation à un monde où les mar-
chés et les techniques évoluent. Dans le domaine 
de l'Information, l'offre ainsi que les modes d'orga-
nisation et de circulation sont d'une importance 
capitale pour le processus de développement. Des 
intermédiaires spécialisés ont ici leur rôle à jouer 
pour permettre aux particuliers, aux entreprises et 
aux institutions d'avoir plus facilement accès aux 
informations adéquates, grâce à la mise en œuvre 
des techniques appropriées. 
22. Il faut, en second lieu, que les régions intensi-
fient leurs efforts visant à développer les capacités 
humaines en fonction de deux objectifs, qui sont, 
respectivement, d'améliorer les compétences et les 
aptitudes dans la région concernée, et de mieux 
former les personnes qui sont appelées à devenir 
des acteurs du développement. Dans une écono-
mie régionale, la qualité et la résolution des acteurs 
du développement dans toute approche visant à 
Influer sur la culture d'entreprises existantes sont un 
des principaux facteurs de changement. 
23. En troisième lieu, sans que la flexibilité en pâ-
tisse, la décentralisation et la coordination s'impo-
sent en ce qui concerne le cadre institutionnel dans 
lequel la politique est conçue et mise en œuvre. Dans 
bon nombre de régions, ce cadre institutionnel peut 
faire défaut et il est difficile de le recréer. Il importera 
donc de veiller à l'existence d'un réseau efficace et 
décentralisé d'institutions régionales, en particulier 
dans les pays où le pouvoir décisionnel est fortement 
centralisé, de telle sorte que la politique adoptée 
puisse être gérée au niveau local, si possible par une 
agence de développement, avec la participation ac-
tive d'autres organismes compétents. 
24. En conclusion, la réussite dans un monde incer-
tain en mutation rapide passe par une information de 
qualité largement partagée, par le haut niveau des 
aptitudes individuelles, par une culture d'entreprise 
bien assimilée et par un cadre institutionnel solide. 
Ce sont là les qualités que les politiques de dévelop-
pement devraient s'attacher à promouvoir, au-delà 
de la satisfaction des besoins fondamentaux en 
matière d'infrastructures, d'enseignement et de for-
mation. Il faut éviter par-dessus tout d'encourager un 
type de développement artificiellement protégé, Isolé 
des réalités du marché, ou, pis encore, d'élever le 
niveau de vie par un accroissement progressif des 
transferts financiers malgré une baisse de l'activité 
productive dans les cas où celle-ci serait imputable 
au refus de modifier des pratiques économiques et 
sociales obsolètes et inadéquates. 
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Introduction 
1.1 Regional disparities 
in the Community 
The last 30 years have seen considerable change in 
regional development patterns within the European 
Community. Between the early 1960s and the mid-
1970s, regional income disparities had declined 
significantly. Unfortunately this favourable trend 
came to an abrupt halt in 1975. In the following 
decade the first oil shock convergence gave way to 
a regressive phase which returned inter-regional 
disparities to the levels of the start of the early 
1970s. The main factors responsible for this disap-
pointing development were the deterioration of the 
general economic climate, the end of migration 
from weaker to stronger Member States as a 
consequence of the recession, and the emergence 
of a new industrial paradigm based upon the use of 
information technologies. However, the situation 
seems to have stabilized around the middle of the 
1980s and recent data suggest a slight reduction in 
the overall level of disparities since 1986 under the 
influence of steady growth in Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland. Nevertheless, ¡n spite of this, the income 
gap between the Community's poorest and richest 
regions remains very wide. In 1989 income per 
capita in the top 10 regions remained more than 
three times that of the bottom 10 regions. Reduc-
tion of these disparities remains a priority as an inte-
gral part of creating a more cohesive Community. 
While all Member States were affected by recession 
¡n the 1970s and more vigorous economic growth 
from 1984 onwards, the impact on the Commu-
nity's lagging regions has not been straightforward. 
In some cases there has been convergence with 
the rest of the Community, in others there has been 
divergence. We cannot therefore see all lagging 
regions in the same light. Some are doing well, and 
can be classified as 'converging regions', on the 
verge of joining the rich areas of the Community, 
others are definite 'diverging regions', on the verge 
of entering a cumulative downward spiral. How can 
this heterogeneity be explained? Which factors have 
led to regional development? Can, or should, these 
be replicated in less successful regions? How will 
plans for greater Community integration affect future 
regional development? What are the Implications for 
policy formation and implementation? 
This report on the development challenges facing 
the Community's lagging regions set out to answer 
these questions through investigating the future for 
the Objective 1 regions in the 1990s. It is based 
upon a longer report compiled by the Groupe de 
recherche européen sur les milieux innovateurs 
(GREMÌ) under the direction of Professor Roberto 
Camagni and Professor Michel Quevlt. This report 
updates the GREMÌ document and takes advan-
tage of recently released data which were not avail-
able for the original research. 
The report examines the performance of the Com-
munity's lagging regions over the 1980s with a view 
to identifying the prospects for development ¡n the 
1990s and the policy initiatives needed to help 
achieve this. It ¡s Important to note that the context 
for development in the 1990s is different from that 
of the previous decade. The 1980s was a decade 
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that began in recession for the Community and 
ended ¡n fairly rapid economic recovery. As the 
report reveals, national differences and national 
macroeconomic policies played a key role in deve-
lopment prospects at the regional level. The 1990s 
will be a decade ¡n which these national differences 
may assume a reduced Importance, particularly as 
the policies set in motion by the 1987 Single Euro-
pean Act for economic and social cohesion take on 
concrete forms. Member States may increasingly 
operate within a Community-wide regulatory frame-
work where national macro-economic policies be-
come increasingly similar. This is not to argue that 
responses will be the same. The impact of Com-
munity-wide measures will be filtered through a net 
of national and regional particularities to create spe-
cific outcomes in specific places. 
1.2 Structure of the report 
The central Issue of this report is the difference bet-
ween converging and diverging regions. Which 
regions are converging and which are diverging? 
What factors lead to convergent or divergent devel-
opment? Will plans for greater Community Integration 
affect whether a region continues to win or lose? Can 
policy turn a diverging Into a converging region? 
Chapter 2 analyses data on the economic perfor-
mance of Objective 1 regions and tries to identify 
those regions which are converging and those 
which are diverging. 
Chapter 3 gives profiles of the main Objective 1 areas 
of Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. Firstly, 
this continues the descriptive emphasis of Chapter 2. 
Secondly, in these countries Objective 1 areas form 
all or a large proportion of the national economy, and 
this is an opportunity to see whether there is a link 
between national economic context and policy on 
the one hand, and regional performance on the other. 
There is a clear tendency for regions in countries who 
pursue sound macro-economic policies to win and 
regions in other countries to diverge, but every coun-
try has its converging as well as Its diverging areas. 
The inference ¡s that sound macro-economic policy is 
important but not sufficient. 
Chapter 4 is an attempt to go deeper, analysing and 
explaining regional success or failure in terms of 
economic theory and in the light of available data. 
Theories such as endogenous growth and 'innova-
tive milieux' are advanced. Some regions fit one 
theory well, other regions will be better described by 
a competing theory. The conclusion is that each of 
the theories has some relevance but none of them 
is the explanation of regional success or failure. 
Chapter 5 looks at prospects for the lagging regions 
¡n the light of the Community's internal market pro-
gramme. For lagging regions, the single market 
both offers new opportunities and threatens new 
problems. This chapter attempts to Identify those 
Objective 1 regions which seem to be in a strong 
position to benefit from the single -market process 
and those regions which are less well placed to take 
advantage of 1992. 
Chapter 6 considers the policy implications of the 
rest of the report. In view of the different nature of 
problems and likely solutions from one region to 
another, and the uncertain effects of economic inte-
gration, there ¡s no single 'miracle cure', but a menu 
of suggestions to be tailored to different circum-
stances. In the absence of a clear recipe for suc-
cess, policy should be continuously subject to criti-
cal scrutiny to ensure that it is achieving the desired 
effects. 
The annex provides a statistical update, showing 
the latest available Eurostat data on regional 
Incomes and the trend. 
1.3 Objective 1 regions 
Finally in this Introduction, ¡t is worth outlining both 
the definitional basis for Objective 1 regions and their 
location. Lagging regions are taken, ¡n this report, to 
be the Objective 1 regions of the European Commu-
nity for the period 1989 to 1993 (defined at the NUTS 
level II: i.e. nomenclature of territorial units for statis-
tics). Objective 1 regions are defined as regions 
where GDP per capita is at least 25% below the 
Community average, although this threshold is 
relaxed in special circumstances (e.g. for Northern 
Ireland). The coverage ¡n 1989 was as follows: 
Greece Entire country 
Spain Andalucía, Asturias, Castilla Leon, 
Castilla La Mancha, Cueta y Melllla, 
Valencia, Extremadura, Gallcia, Canarias 
and Murcia 
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France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
UK 
French overseas departments 
and Corsica 
Entire country 
Abruzzi, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, 
Molise, Puglia, Sardegna and Sicilia 
Entire country 
Northern Ireland. 
All of these regions occupy peripheral positions 
within the Community, mainly to the south and west 
(see Figure 1.1). They covered nearly 40% of the 
Community's territory and contained 21.7% of its 
total population. Average per capita income was 
62% of the Community average. 
The French overseas departments do not figure in 
this report, due to problems of data availability. Lack 
of data also limited the extent to which the Azores, 
Madeira and Corsica could be Included in the 
study. 
Figure 1.1 : Objective 1 regions for the period 1989-93 
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Identifying converging 
and diverging regions 
2.1 Overview 
As a prelude to examining the prospects for the 
Objective 1 regions in the 1990s, the performance of 
regions in the 1980s is examined. Within the cate-
gory of Objective 1 regions, we need to differentiate 
between those regions which have experienced suc-
cess and those which have performed poorly. 
Before considering the specific performance of each 
region, an analysis of the aggregate performance of 
all Objective 1 regions with respect to the European 
average is instructive. During the first half of the 
1970s, Objective 1 regions caught up substantially 
with the EC average income per capita. This was 
due to a combination of higher than average GDP 
growth and a process of population outmigration. In 
the first half of the 1980s, however, GDP growth in 
the Objective 1 regions was only marginally above 
the Community average. Moreover, population in the 
Objective 1 regions grew more rapidly than in the rest 
of the Community as migratory flows diminished or 
reversed. The result was that GDP per capita in 
Objective 1 regions (measured in purchasing power 
parities) fell slightly from 62.0% in 1980 to 61.5% in 
1985. Due to the relative improvement in their eco-
nomic performance in the second half of the 1980s 
the Objective 1 regions were able to make up for the 
ground lost in the early 1980s, and by 1989 per cap-
ita GDP in these regions had increased to 62.1% of 
the Community average. 
While the relative level of per capita GDP ¡n purchas-
ing power parities in the Objective 1 regions hardly 
changed between 1980 and 1989, a different trend 
occurred with respect to productivity. In 1980 
labour productivity in the Objective 1 regions was 
57.6% of the Community average (measured as 
GDP per person employed at current exchange 
rates). In the period 1980-88, the lagging regions 
underwent drastic rationalization of their productive 
capacity. In consequence, productivity Increased to 
62.2% of the EC average by 1988. The result was 
an increase in surplus labour in many regions and 
rising levels of unemployment. 
Against the background of the general trends in dis-
parities within the Community, there have been dif-
ferences between Member States, with some of the 
weaker countries achieving rates of growth above 
the Community average. In Spain, Ireland and Por-
tugal, the tendency was towards very gradual 
convergence on Community average GDP per head 
beginning in 1985-86, with most (but not all) regions 
displaying this tendency. The position of Greece 
and of most of its regions worsened in relation to 
the rest of the Community. The Mezzogiorno 
showed mixed results. The overall result ¡s that dis-
parities in Incomes per head converged slightly at 
the inter-regional level. 
2.2 The recent performance 
of Objective 1 regions: 
winners and losers 
The principal indicator of regional performance cho-
sen was relative change in GDP per capita in pur-
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chasing power parities over the period 1980­89 
(particular attention was paid to the 1985­89 trend). 
It was chosen as a guide to the capability of each 
region to provide, from internal activities, an increa­
sing living standard to its population. The second 
Indicator was the productivity growth (change in 
GDP per employee) to show the growth of local 
competitiveness representing the main instrument 
to achieve increasing living standards. The two indi­
cators were used to produce a list of converging 
and diverging regions. The quality of growth was 
analysed by comparing productivity changes with 
employment creation to indicate whether growth 
could be ascribed to protection of basically uncom­
petitive industry, to rationalization and cuts of the 
least productive jobs, or to a virtuous cycle of 
increased productivity stimulating industry. The 
results of this were then compared with the list of 
converging and diverging regions. All data are provi­
ded in Annex I of this report. 
capita growth over the period 1980­89. 
reveals four groups of regions. 
Figure 2.1 
• First, there are those which were relatively strong 
in 1980 and have improved their position over the 
period 1980­89. Examples of such regions are Mur­
cia, Valencia, Lisboa, Molise, Abruzzi and Sardegna. 
• Then, there are those regions which had very low 
initial levels of GDP per capita ¡n 1980, but which 
have grown at a faster rate than the EC average. 
This group comprises e.g. Canarias, Extremadura, 
Norte, Centra, Algarve, Ireland, Eastern Macedonia, 
Crete, the Ionian and Southern Aegean Islands. 
• There are regions which had a low level of GDP 
per capita in 1980 and which have experienced 
lower than average growth rates. These are; Anda­
lucía, Galicia, Calabria, Northern Aegean Islands, 
Western Macedonia, Thessaly, Peleponnese, Epi­
rus, Central Macedonia and Western Greece. 
2.3 Performance of Objective 1 
regions: GDP per capita 
Figure 2.1 shows GDP per capita levels in purchas­
ing power parities in 1980 plotted against GDP per 
• Finally, there are regions where GDP per capita in 
1980 was higher than the Objective 1 region aver­
age, but where growth has been lower than the EC 
average. These regions Include among others Cen­
tral Greece, Castilla Leon, Asturias, Basilicata and 
Campania. 
Figure 2.1 : GDP per capita: level and change 
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2.4 Performance of Objective 1 
regions: productivity 
Figure 2.2 divides the regions into four categories in 
terms of their productivity rate in 1980 and their 
productivity performance in the period to 1988. 
• The figure reveals a group of regions with higher 
than average productivity levels in 1980 and impro­
ved productivity levels at a rate greater than the EC 
average. These regions comprised e.g. Castilla La 
Mancha, Murcia, Canarias, Puglia and Northern Ire­
land. 
• A second group of regions had low productivity in 
1980 and an increase of less than the EC average. 
Apart from Galicia, this group consisted entirely of 
Greek regions (e.g. Central and Western Macedonia, 
Thessaly, Epirus, Western Greece and Peleponnese). 
• Some regions had low initial productivity levels 
and managed to improve productivity at a level 
greater than the EC average. These regions include 
e.g. Crete, Ionian Islands, Eastern Macedonia, Cen­
tro, Norte, Alentejo and Algarve. 
• Finally, a number of regions had 1980 productivity 
levels greater than the Objective 1 region average, 
but had a poor productivity performance over the 
1980­88 period. These regions include among 
others Basilicata, Calabria, Abruzzi, Sardegna and 
Asturias. 
2.5 The performance of single regions 
In this section the analysis so far is summarized and 
a final classification of Objective 1 regions presen­
ted, based on their performance over the 1980­89 
period. This classification also took into account 
qualitative assessments by national experts. It ¡s 
Important to note that the classification of conver­
ging or diverging regions is a difficult task and one 
which is often subject to arbitrary value judgements. 
Thus strategic sectors vary in different locations and 
the same performance Indices can result from very 
different processes with different meanings. The 
behaviour of individual regions can be positive on 
some indicators and negative on others. Neverthe­
less, a simple classification is useful as a starting 
point for policy. 
Figure 2.2: GDP per person employed: level and change 
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The Objective 1 regions are therefore divided into 
three categories defined in relation to regional per-
formance with regard to the EC average over the 
1980-89 period. These categories are: 
• converging regions with a performance higher 
than the EC average, 1980-89; 
• diverging regions with a performance lower than 
the EC average, 1980-89; 
• mixed-evidence regions which display different 
characteristics dependent upon which indicators 
are utilized, or which have important specific fea-
tures. 
It is useful to note two characteristics of this classifi-
cation. First, it is based upon economic performan-
ce rather than upon static economic strength or 
structure. The main emphasis is upon the capa-
bility of Objective 1 regions to withstand competi-
tion from, and catch up with, stronger European 
regions. Second, the point of reference is the EC 
average rather than the more usually employed 
national averages. Table 2.1 summarizes the cat-
egorization and Figure 2.3 presents the results ¡n 
map form. 
Note: Ireland as a whole falls Into the converging 
category. Classifications at NUTS 3 level were 
determined mainly on the basis of population and 
employment statistics and on some proxies such as 
average industrial wages and net output per 
employee in industry. These data suggest that 
Donegal and North West and Midlands should be 
classified as diverging regions. The remaining 
regions (East, West, South East, South West, Mid 
West and North East) were converging. 
2.6 Regional growth patterns 
The next step in this categorization of Objective 1 
regions, is to analyse regional patterns of growth in 
terms of two variables; productivity and employ-
ment growth. This analysis attempts to Identify the 
'sustainabillty' of regional development and to diffe-
rentiate positive and negative features. For 
example, a positive performance in productivity 
growth could result from either a virtuous process of 
rising competitiveness and growth or from a pro-
cess of rationalization, with employment cuts. Four 
Member 
State 
Italy 
UK 
Ireland 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
France 
Table 2.1 : The performance of Objective 1 regions in 
Converging 
Abruzzi 
Molise 
All regions 
East. Macedonia 
Ionian Isles 
South Aegean Isles 
Crete 
Andalucía 
Castilla La Mancha 
Murcia 
Canarias 
Valencia 
Lisboa 
Norte 
Mixed 
evidence 
Puglia 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
Northern Ireland 
Galicia 
Castilla Leon 
Extremadura 
Algarve 
Centro 
Alentejo 
the 1980s 
Diverging 
Basilicata 
Campania 
Calabria 
Cent. Macedonia 
Attica 
Cent. Greece 
West. Greece 
Epirus 
North. Aegean Isles 
West. Macedonia 
Thessalya 
Peleponnese 
Asturias 
Corsica 
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possible patterns of regional growth are revealed 
(see Figure 2.4): 
• a virtuous cycle, where a higher than average pro­
ductivity growth is associated with a good employ­
ment performance; 
• rationalization, where a higher productivity growth 
is attained through severe employment cuts; 
• a vicious cycle or de­industrialization, where 
employment cuts and closures are unable to restore 
competitiveness and job losses continue; 
• sheltered development, where explicit or implicit 
policies of assistance aid the rapid initial develop­
ment of backward areas and employment genera­
tion, irrespective of poor productivity performance. 
Figure 2.4 classifies the Objective 1 regions into 
these different categories. While not all of those in 
the virtuous cycle category are 'converging' regions, 
the majority are (Canarias, Castilla La Mancha, 
Andalucía, Murcia, Ionian Islands, Crete, Eastern 
Macedonia and Molise). Extremadura is in the 
mixed­evidence category and Campania is (just) a 
'diverging' region. Four regions, Asturias, Galicia, 
Castilla Leon and the Northern Aegean Islands, fall 
into the vicious cycle category. Asturias and the 
Northern Aegean Islands were both classified as 
diverging regions indicating major development prob­
lems ¡n these regions. Gallcia and Castilla Leon are 
mixed­evidence regions. The former had a poor 
performance in the early 1980s, but has consider­
ably improved its performance since 1985. Of part­
icular interest are the large number of regions which 
fell Into the sheltered development category, includ­
ing converging, diverging and mixed­evidence 
regions. The restructuring category largely consists 
of Irish and Portuguese regions indicating Improve­
ment at the expense of employment cuts. 
2.7 Conclusions 
This section has identified the converging and diver­
ging regions amongst Objective 1 regions in the 
1980s. A number of conclusions emerge from this 
analysis. 
• The performance of Objective 1 regions was 
diverse. Indeed, a broad trend was towards greater 
heterogeneity amongst the group of lagging 
regions. Thus some regions are catching up, some 
falling further behind. 
• There ¡s no automatic link between the relative 
strength of the region at present and whether it is 
catching up or not, but those poorer Objective 1 
regions which happen to be falling behind have the 
Figure 2.4: GDP regional growth patterns of the Objective 1 regions, 1980­88 
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worrying prospect of entering a downward spiral. 
• Even for those regions catching up, disparities 
remain very wide and ¡t will take a long time for 
convergence to occur. It should also be noted that 
conditions in the late 1980s were favourable for the 
Objective 1 regions and it remains to be seen wheth-
er they will maintain their position in the current 
recession. 
• With regard to competitiveness, many Objective 1 
regions, often those classified as converging 
regions on the basis of GDP changes, were forced 
into drastic rationalization of productive capacity. 
This resulted in good productivity growth, but at the 
expense of rapidly rising unemployment. Converse-
ly, there are a significant number of lagging regions 
(again Including converging regions) in the sheltered 
development category which indicates problems 
stored up for the future. Few regions, even among 
the converging regions, showed strong signs of a 
virtuous cycle of increasing productivity and 
employment. 
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Annex 1 : Indicators of economic performance of Objective 1 regions 
EUR 12 
Eastern Macedonia EMAC 
Central Macedonia CMAC 
Western Macedonia WMAC 
Thessaly THES 
Epirus EPIR 
Ionian Isles ION 
Western Greece WGR 
Central Greece CGR 
Peleponnese PEL 
Attica ATT 
North Aegean Isles NAEG 
South Aegean Isles SAEG 
Crete CRET 
Galicia GAL 
Asturias AST 
Castilla Leon C-L 
Castilla La Mancha C-LM 
Extremadura EXT 
Valencia VAL 
Andalucía AND 
Murcia MUR 
Canarias CAN 
Ireland IRL 
Campania CAM 
Abruzzi ABR 
Molise MOL 
Puglia PUG 
Basilicata BAS 
Calabria CAL 
Sicily SIC 
Sardegna SAR 
Norte NOR 
Centro CEN 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo LIS 
Alentejo ALEN 
Algarve ALG 
Northern Ireland NIRL 
Objectivei2 01R 
GDP per head (PPS) 
Index (EUR 12 = 100) 
1980 
100.0 
40.6 
51.3 
47.3 
47.6 
37.2 
40.6 
45.0 
71.3 
51.1 
58.6 
35.4 
44.9 
43.4 
61.0 
77.3 
70.5 
61.0 
45.4 
71.8 
56.7 
65.2 
58.9 
60.8 
67.0 
86,6 
77.0 
73.2 
69.7 
57.7 
68.6 
73.8 
44.0 
42.4 
68.7 
49.4 
48.0 
73.8 
62.0 
1985 
100.0 
53.3 
49.8 
47.2 
48.0 
36.6 
44.7 
43.4 
62.9 
51.4 
53.7 
36.0 
49.3 
48.7 
55.1 
73.1 
67.3 
56.7 
47.8 
73.4 
53.7 
63.4 
67.5 
62.4 
69.7 
88.8 
78.2 
71.0 
65.9 
61.5 
68.6 
75.6 
40.2 
47.8 
66.9 
43.6 
44.1 
78.0 
61.5 
1989 
100.0 
52.5 
47.3 
46.1 
46.1 
35.3 
43.0 
41.4 
59.9 
49.4 
51.8 
35.0 
46.5 
46.5 
57.0 
72.7 
68.5 
63.1 
47.6 
75.4 
56.3 
70.5 
74.5 
64.9 
65.8 
88.0 
78.9 
72.7 
61.9 
56.6 
68.1 
74.7 
47.1 
44.9 
69.9 
49.3 
48.9 
76.5 
62.1 
1980-89 
change1 
100 
129 
92 
97 
97 
95 
106 
92 
84 
97 
88 
99 
103 
107 
93 
94 
97 
103 
105 
105 
99 
108 
126 
107 
98 
102 
102 
99 
89 
98 
99 
101 
107 
106 
102 
100 
102 
104 
100 
Total 
population 
% change 
1980-89 
2.5 
-0.2 
8.0 
1.7 
4.5 
4.0 
3.4 
6.0 
6.7 
3.8 
5.4 
0.5 
9.4 
6.4 
0.6 
0.0 
4.4 
6.3 
9.0 
4.0 
9.4 
9.6 
5.1 
3.4 
6.8 
4.2 
2.2 
5.7 
2.0 
4.9 
5.8 
4.6 
1.2 
1.5 
0.7 
2.5 
4.6 
1.6 
4.8 
1 1980-89 change: Calculated as ((X"i/X*i)/(X"n/X*n))*100 where 'X' represents 
per capita GDP, (PPS: Purchasing power standards);""" the beginning of 
the period and "**" the end, ' i ' the region concerned and 'n' EUR 12. 
2 Objective 1 : Sum of the regions in the table (it therefore excludes Corsica, DOM, 
Cueta y Melilla, Madeira and Azores for which no complete data-set could be 
assembled). 
Sources: Eurostat and GREMÌ study (national statistical sources). 
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EUR 12 
Eastern Macedonia EMAC 
Central Macedonia CMAC 
Western Macedonia WMAC 
Thessalya THES 
Epirus EPIR 
Ionian Isles ION 
Western Greece WGR 
Central Greece CGR 
Peleponnese PEL 
Attica ATT 
North Aegean Isles NAEG 
South Aegean Isles SAEG 
Crete CRET 
Galicia GAL 
Asturias AST 
Castilla Leon C-L 
Castilla La Mancha C-LM 
Extremadura EXT 
Valencia VAL 
Andalucía AND 
Murcia MUR 
Canarias CAN 
Ireland IRL 
Campania CAM 
Abruzzi ABR 
Molise MOL 
Puglia PUG 
Basilicata BAS 
Calabria CAL 
Sicily SIC 
Sardegna SAR 
Norte NOR 
Centro CEN 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo LIS 
Alentejo ALEN 
Algarve ALG 
Northern Ireland NIRL 
Objectivei2 01R 
GDP (PPS) per person employed 
Index (EUR 12 = 100) 
1980 
100.0 
43.0 
56.6 
52.6 
50.3 
41.5 
41.2 
47.0 
76.5 
50.5 
67.1 
43.9 
53.1 
44.1 
64.3 
87.4 
83.6 
82.8 
65.5 
93.3 
86.6 
88.6 
86.7 
72.0 
82.8 
93.1 
81.1 
86.4 
80.9 
79.7 
90.4 
91.9 
43.1 
39.7 
66.3 
46.7 
47.9 
78.4 
73.4 
1988 
100.0 
48.9 
48.9 
44.6 
48.1 
36.9 
42.9 
41.7 
60.9 
48.3 
59.4 
43.3 
52.6 
45.1 
58.8 
83.7 
83.0 
85.7 
72.0 
91.7 
87.2 
95.7 
107.8 
81.0 
83.2 
88.7 
81.7 
90.9 
71.7 
70.4 
88.4 
87.7 
47.2 
44.0 
71.1 
52.1 
52.6 
82.0 
73.9 
'1980-88 
change1 
100 
114 
86 
85 
96 
89 
104 
89 
80 
96 
89 
99 
99 
102 
91 
96 
99 
104 
110 
98 
101 
108 
124 
113 
100 
95 
101 
105 
89 
88 
98 
95 
109 
111 
107 
112 
110 
105 
101 
Total 
employment 
% change 
1980-88 
1.6 
10.7 
12.6 
14.1 
3.6 
8.7 
2.6 
7.5 
10.2 
2.6 
3.0 
-1.3 
11.7 
8.9 
0.7 
-3.9 
0.1 
4.0 
1.9 
8.9 
5.6 
7.6 
4.6 
-5.6 
3.8 
10.4 
3.4 
-0.7 
1.6 
15.8 
6.8 
10.3 
-3.7 
-5.5 
-6.8 
-10.8 
-5.5 
0.7 
2.6 
1 1980-89 change: Calculated as ((Χ"ί/Χ1)/(Χ"η/Χ*η))Ί 00 where 'X' represents 
per capita GDP, (PPS: Purchasing power standards);"*" the beginning of 
the period and "**" the end, ' i ' the region concerned and 'n' EUR 12. 
2 Objective 1 : Sum of the regions in the table (it therefore excludes Corsica, DOM, 
Cueta y Malilla, Madeira and Azores for which no complete data-set could be 
assembled). 
Sources: Eurostat and GREMÌ study (national statistical sources). 
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Analysis of the Objective 1 situation 
3.1 Introduction 
Once converging and diverging regions amongst 
Objective 1 regions have been identified, the obvious 
next step is to try and explain the different perfor-
mances. A glance at Table 2.1 reveals an important 
first link. There are definite country effects appearing 
in the table. Thus Spain has a large number of 
converging, Greece has large numbers of diverging 
regions. Italy has a more mixed experience. It is 
worth looking in some detail therefore at the nation-
al context of the Objective 1 regions to assess the 
importance of this 'country effect' and to gain an 
overview of the situation. 
There follows a series of profiles of those nations 
which are wholly or substantially Objective 1, i.e. 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. They are 
partly intended to give an overview of the national 
situation and a background for the examination of 
local economic performance. However, they also 
provide material with which to answer the following 
questions: 
• What national factors have significant influence on 
regional performance and how strong is that 
Influence? 
• How do nations measure up in terms of these 
national factors both now and in the future? 
3.2 General observations 
There are two recent historical trends in disparities. 
First, a decrease in inter-regional disparities was 
common to all of the EC 12 both in the 1960s (with 
the exception of the United Kingdom) and in the 
1970s (with the exception of Germany). Second, 
the 1980s saw the cessation or reversal of the first 
trend. Disparities increased in most countries, 
albeit at different times. The exceptions were 
Spain, where disparities remained almost constant, 
and Portugal, where disparities continued to 
decrease. 
Within the national macro-economic context it is 
possible to observe a diversity of experience. Even 
within a poor national context, some regions can 
still be converging. In addition, this process also 
operates at the regional level. Thus, even within 
'diverging regions' it is possible to find local suc-
cess stories. This experience fits in with evidence 
from a comparative study undertaken in the USA for 
the GREMÌ report, where good economic perfor-
mance was found in 'sunspots' rather than across 
the 'Sunbelt' (see box on next page). 
3.3 Country profiles 
Greece 
In the post-war period, economic development in 
Greece occurred at high rates until the mid-1970s, 
fuelled by high investment rates (30% of GDP in 
some years) and inward investment by foreign capi-
tal. This period led to polarized development in the 
main urban areas of the country, the Greater Athens 
area and Thessaloniki in Central Macedonia. A 
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The US experience: 
The 'Snowbelt-Sunbelt shift'? 
It was thought that the experience of the USA would offer 
some interesting parallels to the development prospects of 
the Community's lagging regions. The dominant spatial 
trend within the US has been a substantial move of econom-
ic activity towards previously underdeveloped areas of the 
country (the Sunbelt) and a revalorization of such areas. A 
study for GREMÌ addressed these issues to try and draw 
out the implications for EC integration. Obviously condi-
tions within the Sunbelt vary considerably, both internally 
and in comparison with Europe's lagging regions. Sunbelt 
economic growth was closely allied with massive popula-
tion movements, both internal to the US, as well as from 
Mexico, Asia and Latin America. The roots of development, 
at least in the South, have their origins in the New Deal and 
later on in the 1960s as part of a deliberate attempt to end 
the dependence of the region upon raw material produc-
tion and cheap labour and create autonomous indigenous 
industrial modernization. This phase provided the infra-
structural preconditions for the subsequent phase of deve-
lopment in the 1970s. Much of this was achieved through 
national legislation to impose the same conditions of work 
and pay as nationally. Similarly much economic develop-
ment has resulted from Federal decisions on defence 
expenditure. 
Some parallels with the lagging regions do exist: southern 
industry has traditionally been based upon a combination 
of local resource-based industrialization and low-skilled 
labour. The principal form of manufacturing growth in the 
post-war South has been less the attraction of new types 
of plant or industrial sectors so much as a reconcentration 
of classic manufacturing sectors in one of their traditional 
centres of strength. These industries remain vulnerable to 
international competition and domestic economic down-
turn. Where high technology employment has been gained 
in the South, the overwhelming share is in standardized 
production and assembly plants. Growth within the Sunbelt 
has been concentrated at two levels: at the level of states, 
growth has predominantly occurred within Texas and Flori-
da; within states, growth has been a metropolitan pheno-
menon. Despite the major employment gains which have 
been achieved in the South, Gordon considers that there is 
little evidence that the South has generated any genuine 
long-term capability for indigenous innovation or dynamic 
comparative advantage. 
High technology industry development in the US has been 
driven not by purely local or global dynamics, but based 
upon precise articulations of regional processes and exter-
nal dynamics. Gordon considers that there is no single les-
son for Europe in the experience of the Sunbelt - even 
where innovative milieux exist their form is complex and 
irreducible to a single model or logic. Thus traditional bran-
ch plant industrialization coexists with more dynamic inno-
vative high-technology milieux and with centralized core 
agglomerations of financial and producer services. The 
basis of growth also varies: some regions have exploited 
temporary cost-based locational advantages, others have 
deployed local know-how and expertise to restructure pro-
duct and process innovation in traditional sectors. In total 
then, diversification of conditions and logics within the Sun-
belt is deemed to be as important as any differentiation 
between the Sunbelt and traditional manufacturing zones. 
In a parallel with the European single market, the integra-
tion of the Sunbelt market presupposed far more than the 
passive elimination of barriers to mobility of goods, ser-
vices, capital and labour. It involved active and extensive 
government intervention in infrastructure development, 
labour market formation, the imposition of socio-economic 
standards and both direct and indirect economic develop-
ment. By comparison with Europe, cultural and economic 
homogeneity in the US was far more advanced immediate-
ly prior to the Sunbelt's take-off. The framework for Sunbelt 
growth in the US fused three critical historically-specific 
elements: aggressive state economic intervention, a new 
cycle of technological transformation, and global political, 
military and economic hegemony. That is, market comple-
tion in the US coincided with particularly advantageous 
domestic and international conditions. As Gordon notes, 
insofar as they are relevant, these factors constitute goals, 
not preconditions, of 1992. 
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growth axis was developed between these two, 
with intense urbanization and Increasing concentra-
tion of employment. In 1981 the Greater Athens 
area had 42.7% of total secondary employment and 
45.6% of total tertiary employment, while the equi-
valent figures for Central Macedonia (Thessaloniki) 
were 17.6% and 14.6%. Against a background of 
strong population growth (from 6.7 million in 1950 
to 10.2 million in 1991) population became increas-
ingly concentrated into the Attica region (20% of 
national population in 1951 and 37.5% in 1988). 
The rest of the country consists of regions with diffi-
culties engendered by peripherally, weak agricul-
tural and industrial structures and unfavourable 
geographical conditions. 
With the advent of the international economic crisis 
from the mid-1970s onwards, capital accumulation 
declined dramatically, as did population out-migra-
tion. Greece never fully recovered from this period 
and macro-economic Internal and external equili-
brium were never restored. The country entered the 
phase of international economic expansion between 
1983-90 with huge problems of inflation, an external 
balance deficit and public finance disorder. The 
Greek economy is suffering from structural prob-
lems involving: 
• a permanent deficit in the balance of payments; 
• continually increasing public sector deficits; 
• the simultaneous problems of inflation and unem-
ployment ('stagflation'); 
• decreasing investment, stagnating production and 
de-industriallzatlon. 
The Greek balance of payments was historically 
kept in balance by trade in 'invisibles', particularly 
from commercial shipping, tourism and migrants' 
remittances. However, from the mid-1980s these 
were reduced. Greece's share of world manufac-
tured exports has fallen, and Greece specializes ¡n 
resource and labour intensive products for which 
world demand has declined. This contrasts with 
other southern European countries where exports 
have grown significantly faster than total world trade 
over the last two decades. The consequent restric-
tions on monetary and fiscal policies, together with 
the weakness of the productive sector, prevented 
Greece from taking advantage of either International 
expansion or EC membership. 
Moreover, public sector imbalances have curtailed 
public investment, which is important given 
Greece's infrastructural deficiencies. Severe supply 
shortages developed ¡n the 1980s. Greece lags 
considerably behind other European countries in 
infrastructure, particularly ¡n the fields of transporta-
tion, communications, water supply and sewage 
works. Without a higher level of investment in these 
it will be difficult to restore higher rates of growth. 
The core areas of Greater Athens and Thessaloniki 
also have severe environmental problems which 
need increased infrastructural spending. The range 
and quality of Greek public services are thought to 
be considerably below average European stan-
dards. Public expenditure on health and education 
is considerably lower than in the rest of Europe. 
For higher education, student supply is restricted 
and demand controlled through entry restrictions. 
More than one quarter of total university students 
study abroad. The shortage of higher education 
graduates leads to skills shortages which impede 
the modernization of the economy and society. 
Overmanning ¡n the public sector is at high levels 
and public pension spending levels are, at 15% of 
GDP, one of the highest ¡n Europe. Relatively short 
pension contribution periods provide a strong 
Incentive to retire early and work in the black market 
economy. Tax evasion is endemic and discourages 
movement of labour into more productive sectors of 
the economy where taxation ¡s more effective. 
With the exception of Attica, all regions of Greece 
have a high proportion of employment in primary 
sectors. Only in the Southern Aegean Islands does 
the proportion drop below 30%. The agricultural 
labour force represents as much as 26% of total 
employment in Greece. As agricultural activities vir-
tually escape taxation there ¡s a strong disincentive 
to move into sectors with a higher productivity 
potential, in addition to the taxation forgone. Indus-
trial employment ¡s concentrated into Attica, Wes-
tern Macedonia, Central Macedonia and Central 
Greece. In the 1971 -81 period only Attica had rates 
of employment growth greater than the national 
average. Employment losses were especially high in 
the Northern Aegean Islands, the Ionian Islands and 
the Peleponnese. Unemployment is also concentrat-
ed Into the Greater Athens area (45.4% of the total 
in 1988) and Thessaloniki (15.1%). 
The core Attica area ran into problems in the 1980s. 
While the 1971-81 period had seen the expansion 
of employment ¡n Attica the consequences were not 
all favourable. There was a huge growth of low pro-
ductivity, low income jobs together with growing 
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unemployment and massive urban problems. In the 
subsequent period to 1987 total Greek employment 
fell and Attica lost 2.9% of its Industrial jobs per 
year. The region's share of national GDP declined 
from 42% ¡n 1970 to 36% in 1985 and GDP per 
capita fell to the national level. Even though Athens 
constitutes the major part of Greece's black econo-
my (estimated at 30% of GDP ¡n total) there are 
definite signs of a deep-seated metropolitan and 
regional crisis. High starting wage levels and Insuffi-
cient training are thought to be major impediments 
to raising employment levels. 
The crisis in the core region of Attica benefited 
almost all other regions where, from the late 1970s 
onwards, new, dispersed light industries and tourism 
had developed ¡n some of the former problem 
regions. Particular benefits were felt ¡n the two more 
industrialized regions of Central Macedonia and Cen-
tral Greece, but Thessaly and Crete also gained. In 
the 1970s all regions, with the exception of the Nor-
thern Aegean Islands, moved closer to the national 
average GDP per capita. In the 1980-85 period the 
reduction in disparities continued although the suc-
cess of Central Macedonia and Central Greece 
disappeared ¡n terms of total GDP and GDP per 
capita. However, they continued to display employ-
ment growth. The success stories of this period were 
based on the development of light industries such as 
food processing, clothing and leather products and 
on tourism. These developments were prevalent in 
Eastern Macedonia, Thrace, the Ionian Islands, the 
Southern Aegean Islands and Western Macedonia. 
However, these endogenous developments have 
never been built upon, through policy. In part this is 
a recognition that many of the necessary conditions 
for indigenous development, such as a skilled 
labour force and good infrastructure, are lacking at 
the local level. Instead, a growth pole strategy, cou-
pled with the aim of reducing the dominance of the 
Athens area, has been followed. Future plans for a 
regional development strategy are limited, although 
recently, policy has shifted from the alternative 
growth pole strategy to an emphasis on 'develop-
ment from below'. Historically, industrial support has 
been directed towards traditional Industries where 
long-term viability is in doubt, diverting investment 
from more profitable activities. Textiles and clothing, 
followed by food, are still the most Important indus-
tries. In a trend which could run counter to Euro-
pean Integration, some policy makers believe the 
potential for future development may rest with the 
opening of Eastern European markets, particularly 
In relation to Bulgaria and Romania. 
Spain 
Economic growth in Spain in the 1960s and early 
1970s was concentrated Into the most advanced 
and industrialized regions of Catalonia, the Basque 
country and Madrid. Diffusion of growth ¡n this per-
iod was limited to the regions immediately surroun-
ding these three core areas, as well as to a limited 
number of provinces (Valencia, Alicante, Zaragoza 
and Sevilla). Meanwhile, the more rural, Internal 
areas of Galicia, Andalucía, Aragon and Extremadu-
ra declined in both economic and demographic 
terms, mainly due to the rationalization of agricultu-
re. The situation changed ¡n the period from 1975-
85 against a background of international crisis and 
restructuring. Internal migration ceased or was 
greatly reduced and crisis conditions emerged in 
the older industrial areas, particularly ¡n the Basque 
regions. At the same time, development spread to 
new areas of Industrialization such as the Mediterra-
nean axis, south of Barcelona, from Gerona to Mur-
cia and some Andalucian coastal provinces, and 
the Ebro Valley. The Baleares and Canarias islands 
were also dynamic, due to the Impact of tourism. 
Madrid's growth continued, based upon Its role as 
the capital and service Industry centre. 
In the period 1985-89 these trends continued and 
the period from 1985 saw strong growth. The 
Mediterranean axis expanded through the Andalu-
cian provinces of Malaga and Almería and the Cata-
lonian economy was revitalized. The Ebro Valley 
increased its dynamism, as did the island and tou-
rist areas of the Canarias and Baleares. However, 
the Cantabrian coast continued to experience prob-
lems. Industrial take-off occurred in new industrial 
areas such as Valencia, Murcia and the coastal pro-
vinces of Andalucía. In the regions along the Ebro 
Valley (Navarra, Rioja and Aragon) industrialization 
came together with the modernization of agricul-
ture. The Spanish economy has been the benefi-
ciary of large-scale foreign investment, amounting 
to over USD 10 billion in 1989 alone. 
The population has grown from 31.5 million in 1964 
to 39.0 million in 1989. Population is greatest ¡n 
Andalucía (17.6% of the total ¡n 1989), Catalonia 
(15.7%) and Madrid (12.7%). Between 1981-86 
only Andalucía and the Canarias had a positive 
balance of population growth. 
38 Cohesion and the development challenge facing the lagging regions 
Employment in agriculture is still an important factor 
¡n some regions. In 1985, Gallcia (43% of total 
employment) and Extremadura (32%), for example, 
both had very high levels of agricultural employment 
compared to the national average (16.5%). Indus-
trial employment accounts for a fairly low proportion 
of the total In most Spanish Objective 1 regions, 
with the exception of Valencia and Asturias. The 
black economy is particularly strong, accounting for 
around 24% of total employment for all the Objec-
tive 1 regions, and is particularly Important in Mur-
cia (31.9%), Andalucía (28.9%) and Valencia (24.5%). 
Unemployment rates were high in Andalucía (27%), 
Extremadura (26.4%) and Canarias (21.5%) ¡n 1989, 
compared to the national average of 17.8%. Unem-
ployment was a particular feature of the younger age 
groups aged between 16-24 in all regions. Infra-
structure remains a problem ¡n most regions, particu-
larly for motorways, railways and telecommunica-
tions. In terms of human capital, only parts of Valen-
cia, Andalucía, Asturias and Gallcia have above ave-
rage levels of educational attainment. 
Regional policy up to 1975 was limited and control-
led from the centre, although ¡t did contain a 
concern for regional Imbalances. Attention was 
directed towards national economic planning, partly 
because the nature of the economic crisis in the late 
1970s necessitated macro-economic action, but 
also because of political considerations. From 1978 
new 'Autonomous Communities' were established 
with a consequent transfer of power and policies 
from the centre. The internal 'regional debate' has 
been galvanized by EC membership, but also 
through this process of federalization whereby regio-
nal governments have Increasing powers to act. 
Ireland 
greatly Increased public debt and a large balance of 
payments deficit. The late 1970s and 1980s expo-
sed the limits to this policy of relying on mobile 
foreign capital and the failure to create a competi-
tive indigenous sector. Divergence occurred in the 
period 1981-86 when Ireland experienced very low 
growth rates of GDP, GDP per capita, private 
consumption per capita and capital investment. 
Emigration also recommenced at high levels from 
the end of the 1980s. Population growth over the 
decade 1976-86 had been the highest in the Com-
munity and the country has a very high dependency 
ratio (0.66) compared to the EC average (0.49). 
From 1986, the national situation improved with 
high GDP expansion and lower population growth. 
Employment in Ireland ¡s divided between a dyna-
mic export-oriented sector based on foreign direct 
investment by transnationals, and local industry 
which ¡s, with a few exceptions, oriented towards 
the domestic market. There Is virtually no direct lin-
kage between the two sectors. This leads to parti-
cular weaknesses, such as low investment in 
research and development in firms. For example, 
although the electronics sector is well-developed in 
Ireland, foreign firms account for over 90% of 
employment and most of their research is done out-
side Ireland. 
This shortcoming in research and technological 
capacity is perhaps surprising given that one of Ire-
land's strengths is Its high output of science and 
technology graduates. However, while potential 
human capital ¡s high, much of this 'leaks' from the 
country through emigration at present. In 1985, 
13% of first degree holders found their first employ-
ment destination overseas, and this figure increases 
to 22% for higher degree holders. 
Since accession to the EC in 1973, there has not 
been an appreciable convergence of Irish GDP per 
capita with the EC average. GDP per capita in 
1986 was 62.4% of the EC average. Some conver-
gence did occur in the 1970s, mainly due to a high 
level of Investment. The 1960s and 1970s saw the 
Irish government establish an 'open door' policy to 
Investors, a radical break with the policies of protec-
tion that had been followed prior to this period. 
Foreign capital was encouraged through substantial 
grants and tax concessions, annual GDP growth 
rose from 1 to 4% and absolute employment levels 
increased. However, this Investment generated little 
growth In subsequent years. The 1970s also saw 
New manufacturing employment developed In the 
1960s and 1970s. While this was quite evenly 
spread spatially, growth has been too small to offset 
falling agricultural employment. The decline in agri-
cultural employment has been the most important 
single influence upon regional employment change 
in Ireland. The share of agriculture in total employ-
ment declined from 39% to 12% over the period 
1950-88. Individual regions vary In terms of agricul-
ture's contribution to total employment from only 
4% ¡n the East region to 28% ¡n the West ¡n 1988. 
This has an Impact at the inter-regional level, where 
one of the few consistent trends has been the decli-
ne of the North West and North East regions related 
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to declining agricultural employment together with 
decline in traditional Industries. The only area to 
have increased employment post-war has been the 
East region, which increased Its share of national 
employment from 30% in 1950 to 39.3% in 1988. 
Much of this has been the product of service sector 
growth associated with the presence of the capital 
city, Dublin, and reflects Increasing centralization. 
Only the Mid West region appears to have maintai-
ned industrial employment ¡n the 1980s. 
Unemployment ¡n all regions Increased over the 
1980s. The rate of unemployment is highest in. 
Donegal and the North West (22.1 % in 1988) close-
ly followed by the North East (20%). Unemployment 
is particularly concentrated amongst male workers, 
reflecting the low participation rates of females in 
the workforce. The latter probably indicates a high 
level of underemployment within the Irish economy. 
Unemployment Is amongst the highest In the EC 
and represents a major problem for policy makers. 
Infrastructural shortcomings — especially the relati-
vely poor quality road network — are Important and 
considered a barrier to growth. Peripherality ¡s 
aggravated by the absence of a land link to other 
members of the Community (a factor which will be 
heightened by the completion of the Channel Tunnel). 
There has been little national debate over regional 
disparity, perhaps understandably given that Ireland 
as a whole forms a single NUTS 2 level region of the 
EC. Debate has occurred over the strategy of 
attracting external investments and whether this 
can be maintained ¡n the face of competition from 
other countries or whether policy should focus in-
stead on encouraging indigenous development. 
There has, however, been little evidence of policy 
shifts ¡n this matter. 'Regional policy' has been more 
concerned with promoting Industrial employment in 
the less developed regions to compensate for agri-
cultural decline. Debate has also centred upon the 
relative merits of concentrating development into a 
small number of selected centres as against general 
regional dispersion of economic activities. A related 
concern has been the growing concentration of 
population ¡n the East region (containing nearly 40% 
of the Irish population). 
Italy 
The underdevelopment of the Mezzogiorno remalns 
a problem of long-standing national importance In 
Italy. With 36% of the national population, it consti-
tutes the largest lagging macro-region in the EC. 
The features of the Mezzogiomo's adverse econom-
ic condition are well-known: a high level of depen-
dency, both upon northern Italian decision-making 
and government assistance, limited access to 
external and International markets through exports, 
limited growth of an Indigenous industrial base and 
growing unemployment. 
In the immediate post-war period growth was 
concentrated into North West Italy. From the 1970s 
onwards growth spread to Central and North East 
areas — the 'Third Italy'. Diffusion of growth into 
the Mezzogiorno occurred mainly as a result of 
direct State Intervention, both through the location 
of large State-owned enterprises (In iron and steel, 
petrochemicals and automobiles) and through the 
attraction of branch plants of Northern firms. GDP 
per capita ¡n the South in the period 1960-75 grew 
from 55.7% to 70.8% of the national average. Inter-
regional disparities declined due to both the growth 
of production and outmlgratlon. 
The period from the mid-1970s until 1984 saw the 
onset of economic crisis for the whole country, 
although the growth of the Third Italy continued. 
Convergence occurred between the North and 
West and the Central, North and Eastern regions, 
while the South was largely excluded. While the 
1960-75 period had seen the Mezzogiomo's share 
of national GDP increase from 23% to 25.1%, after 
this date the share stabilized. In 1984 the South's 
share of GDP (25.2%) was the same as in 1975. 
Coupled with higher natural demographic growth, 
GDP per capita declined to 66.3% of the national 
average. Thus, while Northern Italy is more prosper-
ous, in terms of GDP per capita, than the average 
levels reached in Germany, the South ¡s similar to 
Spain, and not much greater than much of Portugal 
and Greece. 
The period from 1985-88 saw national economic 
recovery with increases in both GDP and productiv-
ity. However, this was most pronounced in the 
North West, mainly due to high levels of investment 
and faster adoption of new technology. The Mezzo-
giorno performed badly with regard to both GDP 
per capita and unemployment, even ¡n the relative 
success story of Abruzzi. Productivity is also low in 
the Objective 1 regions: productivity per employed 
person was around 75% of the Northern level in the 
late 1980s. Unemployment rates in Italy in 1987 
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ranged from 5.9% in Valle d'Aosta to 21.6% in 
Calabria and 23.3% ¡n Campania. High unemploy-
ment is perhaps the most serious single regional 
problem, particularly amongst young people. Falling 
wage differentials between North and South have 
contributed to unemployment and acted as a disin-
centive to both new private investment and inter-
regional migration. Overall economic performance 
was particularly poor In the South-Island regions 
(the southern regions of Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria 
and the Islands). 
The Mezzogiorno consists of eight Objective 1 
regions which, in contrast to many of the other 
Objective 1 countries, have been the subject of 
substantial regional policy Intervention in the post-
war period. Indeed, relative disparities in produc-
tion capability have not been paralleled by dispari-
ties ¡n personal well-being and consumption levels. 
Personal disposable income in the Mezzogiorno is 
increasingly supported by public income transfers. 
From the late 1970s onwards, expenditure shifted 
away from investment and towards such transfers. 
While this policy may have supported demand, it 
hindered productivity increases and did little to 
increase local supply side factors. While the figures 
need looking at with care, it can be observed that 
external assistance to the Mezzogiorno over the 
past 35 years has consistently formed around 18-
20% of its GDP. While these transfers reduce inter-
regional disparities in disposable Incomes and 
consumption they create their own problems of 
dependency and reduce potential for endogenous 
development. The need to reduce national public 
sector deficit will, ¡n future, limit funds available to 
address regional differentials. While the decrease 
in the wages gap between North and South may 
have hindered a rise in productive employment, any 
attempt to restore differentials runs the dual risk of 
Increasing migration and trying to compete with 
other low cost producers. 
The 1980s thus saw changes in the Southern 
regions with the continued underdevelopment of 
regions such as Basilicata and Calabria and growth 
¡n other areas such as Abruzzi and Molise. Indeed, 
differences within the South are now more signifi-
cant than the difference between the Southern ave-
rage and the Italian average. The more successful 
areas have an experience which ¡s closer to that of 
Central Italy than the rest of the South. It has been 
argued that the Adriatic Objective 1 regions may 
break away from the South ¡f these trends continue 
throughout the 1990s. Conversely, the remaining 
regions have undergone little development, with the 
exception of a few isolated success stories. 
Portugal 
Post-war industrialization in Portugal occurred as a 
product of three important factors. First, strong 
governmental support and protection to basic 
industry occurred in the 1950s and later the 
1970s. This was concentrated in the Lisboa et 
Vale do Tejo, Setúbal and Sines areas. Second, 
after joining EFTA in 1960 there was a sponta-
neous growth of textile, clothing and footwear 
firms in the Porto area. Third, an exchange rate 
depreciation policy was operated between 1977-
85 which supported export industries, particularly 
those based on labour Intensity. Few of these 
developments took place in the context of a devel-
oped regional strategy. Regional policy until EC 
entry in 1986 was virtually non-existent. Only the 
petrochemical complex at Sines, on the Alentejo 
coast, was specifically developed ¡n this context 
with the (disappointed) aim of establishing a grow-
th pole. After the 1974 revolution a new system of 
autonomy emerged at the municipal level. This has 
led to the establishment of local infrastructure 
which could be of importance in the longer term. 
However, such local infrastructure is far from 
widespread and this, together with the lack of an 
intermediate regional policy authority, is thought to 
be likely to hinder Indigenous development ¡n the 
short to medium term. 
The potential for development varies by regions. 
Norte ¡s a highly Industrialized region, but the struc-
ture of industry is biased towards labour-intensive 
sectors. All regions have problems of Internal divi-
sions, with coastal areas being Industrialized while 
the interiors are backward. Some 80% of national 
GDP ¡s produced In the coastal areas while the 
interior comprises the country's poorest areas. 
Indeed, the Interiors of the Norte and Alentejo both 
have one of the lowest development levels ¡n the 
EC. Education levels and infrastructure, for example 
in telecommunications, are low and these may hin-
der future development. Only Lisboa and Norte look 
likely to be the beneficiaries of any development, at 
least in the short to medium term. Norte, however, 
may be subject to strong competitive pressure 
given the region's dependence on labour Intensive, 
'sensitive sectors' such as textiles, clothing and 
footwear. Both Lisboa and Porto are subject to 
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severe problems of overconcentratlon and conges-
tion. Development within Portugal to date has been 
highly concentrated into these two regions, and 
within these regions largely ¡n the coastal areas. 
Lisboa produces 46% of national GDP, and the 
Norte region an additional 31 %. 
Overall Portuguese GDP per capita was 57% of the 
EC average in 1989. Lisboa had around 75% of the 
EC average GDP per capita, Algarve and Alentejo 
between 50-55% and Norte 50%. Regional dispari-
ties in disposable income are diminished to some 
extent by remittances from emigrants, as most emi-
grants come from regions other than the Lisboa 
region. In total, emigrants' remittances comprise 
around 2.5% of national GDP. Both Centra and 
especially Alentejo have high levels of employment 
in agriculture (41.1 % and 47.9% respectively). Agri-
culture in Alentejo has low levels of efficiency and 
will struggle to be competitive in a European 
context. While agriculture ¡s also important ¡n the 
Algarve (25.6% of employment), the region has 
benefited from infrastructural improvements as a 
consequence of tourist development. For Portugal 
as a whole, tourist revenues constituted 6.3% of 
GDP in 1980. 
The 1980s have seen rapid growth of the economy 
— since 1985 national GDP has been growing at 
an annual average rate of 4.2%. There has also 
been a large increase ¡n foreign investment in Por-
tugal, with the share of foreign investment originat-
ing from other EC countries virtually doubling since 
1985. Despite this, many of the success stories of 
the Portuguese economy, such as the export 
Industries of Norte and tourism in the Algarve, 
would seem to have rested upon the country's 
policy of exchange rate depreciation. This is not a 
policy which will be able to continue under the dis-
cipline imposed by EMS. Labour costs are likely to 
rise and competitiveness decrease. The 1980s saw 
a reduction ¡n disparities within Portugal. This was 
a product of two parallel processes. First, the 
richest region, Lisboa, increased its share of GDP 
but also had a high level of ¡n-mlgration which 
reduced per capita GDP levels. Second, the 
poorest region, Centro, lost population which 
Increased GDP per capita performance despite a 
static share of national GDP. The country's Impro-
ved position has also been related to EC entry. 
After 1985, the country took up new trade and 
development opportunities largely based on the 
comparative advantage of low labour cost. 
3.4 Synthesis of profiles 
In retrospect, it is possible to see a marked break ¡n 
the evolution of ¡nter-reglonal disparities within the 
European Community dating from the period of 
economic crisis In the mid-1970s. This resulted in a 
reduction in large multinational investment projects 
which countries such as Greece and Ireland had 
relied upon to overcome late industrialization. 
Moreover, ¡nter-reglonal movement within countries, 
whether private sector-led or Induced through 
government policy, also came to a halt. In addition, 
crisis in the more developed regions of the Commu-
nity resulted in a reduction in, or even a reversal of, 
the process of out-migratlon from the Objective 1 
regions which had helped offset demographic 
trends. Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal were all 
hit hard by this latter process. These factors, com-
bined with renewed international crisis from the 
early 1980s brought to an end the long-term trend 
of decreasing disparities within the EC. 
When renewed growth came from 1983-84 onwards, 
it occurred within a different context to the develop-
ment phase of the 1970s. In particular, international 
agreements on monetary and exchange rate policies 
restricted the use of devaluation as a tool of Industrial 
and development policy. This, together with techno-
logical changes and Increased European Integration, 
favoured development within the core areas of natio-
nal economies. Some countries were able to adapt 
to this and have displayed relative growth, particularly 
Spain. Conversely, others such as Greece have so 
far been unable to cope with these changed condi-
tions. In part, this ¡s a product of structural adjust-
ment policies. While in Spain and Portugal market 
reforms in areas such as labour and finance have 
been Introduced, Greece has been slow in coming to 
terms with the need for structural reform. Spain's 
particular success and earlier market liberalization are 
interrelated. Greece has maintained limited export 
markets in manufactures and tends to specialize in 
those areas, such as textiles and clothing, where 
international competition and cost competition is 
strong. Conversely, Spain and Portugal have gained 
export market shares as they adjusted their produc-
tion structures to sell products for which world 
demand is growing fastest and have Improved their 
competitiveness, quality and marketing. 
Structural reforms in Spain and Portugal have also 
encouraged both foreign and domestic investment 
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and induced a shift towards advantageous trade 
and production structures. Both Spain and Portugal 
were quick to lift import barriers and export subsid-
ies after EC accession and subsequently enjoyed a 
sharp Improvement ¡n their terms of trade. In Spain, 
productivity In those sectors which have been the 
target of foreign Investment has risen twice as fast 
as the national average. Investment In Spain and 
Portugal has resulted In both substantial job crea-
tion and more efficient economic systems. Conver-
sely, in Greece the sluggishness of investment has 
led to a levelling off of both productivity and the 
volume of employment. However, all these countries 
still suffer from infrastructural inadequacies, espe-
cially for communications, which explains why 
Investment has been concentrated around the lar-
ger towns. Infrastructural problems in terms of skill 
shortages also need attention ¡n the southern Euro-
pean countries, although Ireland is relatively well-
placed In terms of human capital. 
important in the Balearics, Industry in Abruzzi. For 
both regions and local successes the task ¡s there-
fore to identify common factors behind success to 
see if they can be reproduced elsewhere. Theoreti-
cal explanations for success are considered in the 
next chapter and tested in the light of the country 
profiles in this chapter and other statistical informa-
tion. 
3.5 Conclusions 
National factors appear to play a major role in deter-
mining inter-regional disparity; the generally good 
performance of Irish regions and the generally bad 
performance of Greek regions can be put down to 
their relative macro-economic policies. Sound 
macro-economic policies and investment ¡n infra-
structure are undoubtedly the best basis for regional 
development which lasts in the long term. It should 
be noted in this context that all Objective 1 regions 
still have Important infrastructural gaps such as in 
transport and communications, education and train-
ing; this has usually hindered, but not always pre-
vented, development. Similarly, some countries 
have important structural Inadequacies. 
However, there is a diversity of performance within 
the same macro-economic context; even within 
poorly performing regions there may be some local 
success stories. Nor is good infrastructure a guaran-
tee of success. The best that can be said is that the 
lack of infrastructure and a bad macro-economic 
context hinder development. Even then there are 
examples of success (e.g. Ireland) with a relatively 
poor Infrastructure. There is undoubtedly more to 
development than just infrastructure and macro-
economics. 
The routes to success are varied; tourism has been 
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Explaining the development 
patterns of the 1980s 
4.1 Introduction 
So far the analysis has described and categorized 
the development experiences of the Objective 1 
regions on the basis of performance. In Chapter 2 
the converging and diverging regions were Identified 
and contrasted. In Chapter 3 the influence of the 
national context upon the Objective 1 regions per-
formance was examined. The latter provided some 
indication of the factors underlying differences in 
levels of development and in regional growth perfor-
mance. Both chapters clearly demonstrated the 
diversity of experience within Objective 1. This 
chapter is an attempt to analyse what makes a 
region a strong or weak performer, a diverging or 
converging region. 
First a number of structural variables are examined 
to see if they help explain differences in the perfor-
mance of the lagging regions. The choice of 
variables derived from a reading of existing regional 
development literature. Thus, an attempt was made 
to assess empirically whether the main develop-
ment factors put forward by theory provide us with 
a sufficient explanation. As will become evident, 
these factors help to explain the level of develop-
ment to some extent, but none of the theories 
convincingly explain the performance of the Objec-
tive 1 regions during the 1980s. In an attempt to 
provide a more satisfactory explanation for the diffe-
rences in growth rates of Objective 1 regions, 
GREMÌ advances the theory of 'innovative milieux'. 
In the last part of this chapter, we examine in more 
detail the concept of 'milieu Innovateur' as this cap-
tures many of the Intangibles in development (such 
as district economies and entrepreneurial spirit) 
which the empirical analysis does not. 
4.2 The theoretical background 
The basic approach to regional development in this 
project was to define regional development as the 
ability of each region to produce — by virtue of 
either a competitive advantage — the goods and 
services that are demanded by the national and 
international system of which they form a part. This 
definition highlights two elements at the basis of 
development; supply elements, in the form of a 
comparative or competitive advantage for local pro-
duction, and demand elements, mainly external to 
the local economic system. While both sides of the 
equation are Important, the research team identified 
supply el-ements as the soundest basis for long-
term development potential. First, only a highly 
flexible, diversified and Innovative local economy 
can secure the continuous regeneration of an 
export base. Second, a growing proportion of trad-
ed goods concerns products which are new, and 
where previous demand did not exist. Third, the inter-
national mark-et Is broad by comparison with the size 
of a single region. Even specialization in traditional, 
slow-growing or stagnant sectors may be beneficial 
to a region if it succeeds ¡n controlling a growing 
share of the international market. 
At risk of oversimplifying, we could argue that the 
post-war debate on regional development has been 
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dominated by two major schools of thought, namely 
the 'convergence' and 'divergence' schools. 
The 'convergence' school, which ¡s also the oldest 
of the two, builds on the neo­classical theory of 
international trade. According to this theory, national 
or regional differences in factor endowments are the 
main reason for International and ¡nte­rreglonal diffe­
rences ¡n factor income. However, according to the 
neo­classical international trade theory, the free 
movement of goods and services will equalize fac­
tor returns and standards of living among countries. 
At the regional level, mobility of factors of produc­
tion would bring about regional convergence in fac­
tor income and in standards of living. The persisten­
ce of income disparities in the Community is due 
mainly to poorly functioning product and factor mar­
kets (non­tarrif barriers to trade and imperfect 
mobility of labour or capital). Proponents of the neo­
classical school would therefore argue that the 
creation of a fully­Integrated European economy is 
likely to facilitate Income convergence among Mem­
ber States and regions. 
At the other side of the spectrum, there is a well­
established line of thinking In the regional debate 
which stresses the mechanisms working towards 
divergence rather than convergence. Theories of 
cumulative causation challenge the view held by the 
neo­classical school that inter­regional factor move­
ments would automatically lead to factor Income 
convergence. They argue that agglomeration and 
scale economies as well as externalities (Including 
economies of urbanization) play a crucial role in the 
location of new economic activities, a view based 
on the empirical observation of location patterns in 
most Industrialized countries. As a result, propo­
nents of this school of thinking warn of the risk that 
the increase in factor mobility which further econo­
mic integration will bring will also Increase the 
attractiveness of the most developed parts of the 
Community, and this to the detriment of the poorest 
regions. 
4.3 Statistical analysis 
In their study on the development performance of 
Objective 1 regions, Professor Camagni and Profes­
sor Quévit make an attempt to identify the factors 
which have led to differential economic performance 
of these regions in the 1980s (see Section 2 above). 
The study places a particular emphasis upon exa­
mining those factors which may help to indicate the 
existence of, or potential for, development sugges­
ted by the main strands of regional development 
theory. The aim of the study was to look at whether 
there were any crucial elements upon which some 
regions have built a competitive advantage and 
Figure 4.1 : GDP performance and degree of industrialization of lagging regions 
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which has allowed them to successfully cope with 
the macro-economic and international conditions of 
the 1980s. The focus was solely upon Objective 1 
regions as the intention was to examine to what 
extent traditional regional development theory ¡s 
able to explain different performances within this 
group of regions. 
Looking at Figures 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter 2, it is 
obvious that neither of the two main schools of 
thought in the regional debate offers a satisfactory 
and comprehensive explanation for the differences in 
economic performance among Objective 1 regions. 
While many of the lagging regions are catching up 
and while It is also true that those furthest behind are 
often catching up the fastest, ¡t is equally clear that 
there are a very significant number of Objective 1 
regions which have continued to diverge from the 
Community average. It ¡s not very surprising then 
that no significant statistical relationship could be 
established between the initial level of development 
(as reflected by per capita GDP in 1980) and the 
economic performance of Objective 1 regions bet-
ween 1980 and 1989 (as measured by the rate of 
growth of per capita GDP during that period). 
A second important question that emerges is whe-
ther It is possible to Identify, on the basis of the exis-
ting regional development literature, certain structu-
ral factors that lead lagging regions to success or 
failure. A first attempt at answering these questions 
Involved undertaking correlation and regression 
analyses of the relationship between economic per-
formance indicators (per capita GDP level and 
growth) and a number of structural variables which 
have frequently been advanced as Important devel-
opment factors in regional economic theory. These 
included variables reflecting: 
• the industrial structure of the regions, 
• the degree of external control over the regions' 
Industrial fabric; 
• average wage levels in industry; 
• human capital endowment and Investment (i.e. 
AGR 
IND 
SAL 
EXT 
EDUC 
GRAD 
R&D 
URB 
CEN 
INFR 
GDP1 
GDP2 
PERF 
Table 4.1 : Correlation between economic 
AGR 
1.00 
-0.56 
-0.34 
-0.37 
-0.46 
-0.50 
-0.27 
-0.58 
-0.54 
-0.54 
-0.57 
-0.59 
-0.04 
IND 
-0.56 
1.00 
0.54 
0.41 
0.49 
0.31 
-0.09 
0.35 
0.76 
0.39 
0.69 
0.61 
-0.19 
SAL 
-0.34 
0.54 
1.00 
0.31 
0.55 
0.37 
-0.31 
-0.10 
0.71 
0.53 
0.67 
0.63 
-0.12 
EXT 
-0.37 
0.41 
0.31 
1.00 
0.52 
0.08 
0.09 
0.31 
0.31 
0.50 
0.43 
0.41 
-0.07 
EDUC 
-0.46 
0.49 
0.55 
0.52 
1.00 
0.22 
0.02. 
0.21 
0.54 
0.58 
0.76 
0.70 
-0.24 
GRAD 
-0.50 
0.31 
0.37 
0.08 
0.22 
1.00 
0.38 
0.29 
0.36 
0.33 
0.29 
0.24 
-0.13 
performance and structural indicators 
R&D 
-0.27 
-0.09 
-0.31 
0.09 
0.02 
0.38 
1.00 
0.52 
-0.09 
0.07 
-0.11 
-0.12 
-0.02 
URB 
-0.58 
0.35 
-0.10 
0.31 
0.21 
0.29 
0.52 
1.00 
0.22 
0.32 
0.22 
0.27 
0.12 
CEN 
-0.54 
0.76 
0.71 
0.31 
0.54 
0.36 
-0.09 
0.22 
1.00 
0.47 
0.80 
0.76 
-0.12 
INFR 
-0.54 
0.39 
0.53 
0.50 
0.58 
0.33 
0.07 
0.32 
0.47 
1.00 
0.62 
0.57 
-0.18 
GDP1 
-0.57 
0.69 
0.67 
0.43 
0.76 
0.29 
-0.11 
0.22 
0.80 
0.62 
1.00 
0.94 
-0.19 
GDP2 
-0.59 
0.61 
0.63 
0.41 
0.70 
0.24 
-0.12 
0.27 
0.76 
0.57 
0.94 
1.00 
0.15 
PERF 
-0.04 
-0.19 
-0.12 
-0.07 
-0.24 
-0.13 
-0.02 
0.12 
-0.12 
-0.18 
-0.19 
0.15 
1.00 
AGR Percentage share of agriculture In total employment 
IND Percentage share of Industry In total employment 
SAL Average monthty labour costs of manual and non-manual workers in Industry 
EXT Percentage share of manufacturing employment in externally controlled plants 
EDUC Percentage of 15-19 year age-group ¡n full-time education or training 
GRAD Number of graduates of tertiary education per 1 000 Inhabitants 
R&D R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
URB Percentage of regional population living in cities with more than 50 000 inhabitants 
CEN Peripherality index 
INFR Infrastructure endowment index 
GDP1. Per capita GDP in 1980 On purchasing power standards) 
GDP2 Per capita GDP in 1989 (in purchasing power standards) 
PERF Growth of per capita GDP between 1980 and 1990 
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number of graduates of tertiary education, partici­
pation rate of 15­19 year olds In education, R&D 
expenditure); 
• degree of urbanlzation/rurality; 
• degree of centrality; 
• level of infrastructure endowment. 
The results of the correlation analyses are presented 
in Table 4.1. Scattergrams showing the relationship 
between regional performance and the most impor­
tant structural factors are shown in Figures 4.1 to 4.4. 
Figure 4.2: GDP performance and labour costs in industry in the lagging regions 
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Figure 4.4: GDP performance and infrastructure endowment of the lagging regions 
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As can be seen from the table, the analysis produ-
ced statistically significant and positive correlations 
between the level of per capita GDP ¡n 1980 and in 
1989 and structural variables such as degree of 
industrialization, secondary education participation 
rates, urbanization, centrality and infrastructure 
endowment and a statistically significant negative 
correlation of per capita GDP levels and the share of 
agriculture in total employment (which is arguably 
also a measure of the degree of rurality). However, 
correlating the above structural factors with per 
capita GDP growth between 1980 and 1989 did not 
produce any statistically significant results. 
This means that, at best, the theories outlined 
above are only part of the story. 
These statistical analyses are useful, in that they 
indicate that certain structural factors are Important 
in explaining the level of development within a 
region, but there is little or no explanation of perfor-
mance. From this analysis we therefore have no real 
explanation of why certain Objective 1 regions are 
converging and others are diverging. In total then 
the combinations of possible structural success fac-
tors are too wide to be captured by even a complex 
taxonomy. Regional specificities are so varied that in 
different historical and macro-economic contexts 
they can give rise to a wide spectrum of alternative 
behaviour. In so far as it can be defined through 
these rough statistical indicators, regional structure 
therefore only partially explains regional perfor-
mance. Moreover, these indicators do not provide 
us with any indication of how regions will perform In 
the future. From this analysis, infrastructure, indus-
try and human capital are all important factors ¡n 
explaining levels of regional GDP. The task that 
remains is therefore to identify the specific catalytic 
elements that have generated growth/economic 
take-off in different regional contexts and those fac-
tors that can be built upon through policy mea-
sures. 
4.4 The concept of 'milieu innovateur' 
During the 1980s, regional analysts became increa-
singly aware that neither of the two main schools of 
thought could offer a satisfactory explanation to the 
complex patterns of locational changes in the more 
developed parts of the world. Whilst traditional 
theory stressed the importance of the relations bet-
ween regions (e.g. the centre-periphery relations, 
inter regional factor mobility), new approaches focu-
sed on the endogenous development potential of 
individual regions and on the factors capable of 
acting as a catalyst for the mobilization of that 
potential. Theories which emphasize the importance 
of Innovation-led regional development have subse-
quently served to emphasize the conclusions from 
endogenous growth models. 
Building on these new approaches, the GREMÌ 
group developed the concept of 'milieu Innovateur' 
which it sees as a dynamic counterpart to the 
concept of industrial districts which evolved In the 
endogenous growth model. Its main differences 
reside in the attention paid to Innovation processes 
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and ¡n the emphasis placed upon external and dis-
trict economies and synergy. An innovative milieu ¡s 
defined as 'the set of relationships occurring within 
a geographical area which bring unity to a produc-
tion system, economic actors, and an Industrial cul-
ture, generating a localized dynamic process of 
"collective learning" and acting as an uncertainty-
reducing mechanism In the Innovation process'. 
Originally, the Innovative milieu concept was used 
by GREMÌ to explain the success of Industrial dis-
tricts ¡n the Third Italy'. These areas tend to focus 
on one particular craft-based Industry and are cal-
led 'Third Italy' to distinguish them from the heavily 
Industrialized regions in the north of Italy and the 
underdeveloped Mezzogiorno. GREMÌ studies have 
Identified common features of innovative milieux: 
some specialization ¡n a technology or 'filiere', 
strong interactions and synergies within the area, 
wide imitation and collective learning processes and 
a strong psychological sense of belonging to a local 
community. 
The model ¡s an endogenous growth one, in that it 
emphasizes the local framework. Specialization is 
the key, leading to high synergy in the regional eco-
nomy: 
• a large pool of labour with skills specific to the 
sector; 
• a network already in place of suppliers and buyers 
of the products; 
• new firms start up readily in this fertile environ-
ment, especially since the entrepreneurs can draw 
on a lot of expertise ¡n the sector; 
• flexibility of supply as a firm can choose between 
many suppliers. A consequence of this is strong 
competition between suppliers and a high level of 
competitiveness; 
• because of local sense of community, staff turn-
over and supplier relationships, there is widespread 
collective learning and the rapid spread of innova-
tion. There is also far more innovation as many firms 
are producing it; 
• the region acquires a reputation for the sector and 
links with external suppliers, customers and inves-
tors. 
The more conventional framework factors such as 
education and infrastructure are still important ¡n 
this story (Indeed, the abundance of skills is possi-
bly crucial). But the coherency of the regional eco-
nomy and Intangible factors such as informal net-
works are also part of the explanation for economic 
success. Therein lies the attractiveness of the 
model; not only can the processes outlined ¡n the 
model be observed in parts of Italy and elsewhere in 
the Community, but also an explanation ¡s provided 
for the lack of automatic linkage between economic 
success and single factors such as Infrastructure. 
The important thing is not any single feature of the 
economy, but that It forms a coherent whole. 
The fact that local resources are Involved and util-
ized in the development of an innovative milieu 
does not mean that the process can only start as a 
product of indigenous entrepreneurship. The cata-
lyst for many Third Italy industrial districts was an 
external firm setting up to take advantage of the 
skills already there. However, if external Invest-
ments are attracted to a region, they have to link 
up with and Involve elements other than a cheap 
labour force and unspoilt environments if a self-
sustaining development process ¡s to emerge. 
Local synergy among local actors and between 
them and external Investments can compensate 
the local economy for the lack of other, more tradi-
tional advantages such as economies of scale and 
advanced production. 
A link with an external dynamic ¡s crucial even in 
cases where the development process is started by 
indigenous entrepreneurship. The potential for 
continued development relying solely on local capa-
bilities is limited in the long run. Cooperation with 
external institutions, firms or public agencies and 
research centres is important, as ¡s the external 
dynamic for product and market diversification, ¡n 
order to continually recreate local competitiveness 
and local innovative capacity. This is perhaps even 
more important in lagging regions where conditions 
for the generation of local innovative milieux are 
weak. 
The policy Implications that flow from this are forms 
of external Intervention that can mobilize and activa-
te indigenous resources synergetlcally, through 
technological cooperation agreements, know how 
transfers and the movement of resource 'packages' 
such as complex technological projects or produc-
tion and training. If development is to occur then ¡t 
must take place through the processes Identified by 
GREMÌ. These are the involvement of local 
resources, the creation of synergies among local 
actors and factors, a link-up with external energies, 
and a continuing process of innovation. 
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Innovation ¡n the context of lagging regions must of 
necessity be conceived of in a wide ranging sense 
rather than solely as a leading edge technological 
advance. Indeed, a spectrum of innovation can be 
observed with an increasing order of complexity 
and a decreasing probability of introduction: 
• intersectoral job shifts, for example from agricul-
ture into light Industry, or from trade to advanced 
services; 
• rapid diffusion of successful practices across the 
local 'district', for example of products, technologies, 
organizational schemes and marketing strategies; 
• application of advanced technologies Into tradition-
al spheres of production and organizational forms; 
• incremental innovations on existing products and 
technologies; 
• radical innovations. 
It is difficult to produce a watertight statistical identifi-
cation of innovative milieu. This is, firstly, because of 
the fact that Innovative milieux are characterized by 
Intangibles and, secondly, because they usually 
cover areas much smaller than NUTS 3 and they are 
statistically 'drowned out' by the surrounding area. It 
¡s possible, however, to look for certain tell-tale signs 
such as concentrations of one or several industries, 
rapidly growing income and/or employment, and a 
reputation for quality and Innovation. In finding these 
signs, the advice of national and local experts is as 
Important as statistical data. A broadbrush view is 
given below. For an attempt at complete classifica-
tion of Objective 1 regions, see the GREMÌ report. 
The evidence presented indicates that local suc-
cess stories exist in every country. Moreover, inves-
tigations by the national teams revealed that Innova-
tive milieux do exist in Objective 1 regions. These 
identified milieux are found in both converging and 
diverging regions. Of the total identified by GREMÌ, 
ten are found in converging regions (Limerick-Shan-
non, Andalucía, Castilla La Mancha, Murcia, Valen-
cia, Heraklion, Xanthl, Rhodes, Val Vibrata, Raiano), 
five in diverging regions (Asturias, Patra, Kastoria, 
Solofra and Volos) and the remaining eleven in 
mixed-evidence regions (Extremadura, Gallcia, Cas-
tilla Leon, Castelo Branco, Avelro-Viseu, Leiria, Bar-
letta, Costa Smeralda, Calanglanus, Casarano and 
Canlcattl). This means that there is a basis on which 
to build everywhere. 
A caveat to the above is that innovative milieux are 
the exception rather than the rule in Objective 1 
regions. Much more common were isolated deve-
lopments of branch plants or State-owned enter-
prises or areas of handicraft and light industry pro-
ducing for local markets. 
Innovative milieux are based on different kinds of 
activity. Barletta ¡n Puglia Italy is based on leather 
goods and sport footwear (70% of Italy's sport foot-
wear comes from there). Pinhal Litoral in Portugal 
specializes in traditional ceramics and glass which 
has lead via skill availability to more modern things 
such as plastics and industrial moulds (this innova-
tive milieu is a major innovator in moulds). Alto Deva 
in Spain specializes in metal transformation, Costa 
Smeralda in tourism. It should be noted that some 
of this is high-tech, some commonplace, but 
always featuring Innovation 
It is difficult to tell In advance whether a region will 
become an Innovative milieu, but many have the 
potential. Two possible trajectories towards an inno-
vative milieu are: first, an external Innovative inter-
vention can take place, which is then subsequently 
embedded and Integrated into the local society, 
partly due to public policy; second, through the 
development of local synergies. 
The Identified milieux fall Into two main categories. 
First there are a group of milieux which are in a vir-
tuous cycle where future regional growth patterns 
have good prospects. These comprise Costa Sme-
ralda, Limerick-Shannon, Valencia, Val Vibrata, 
Raiano, Murcia, Canlcatti, Leiria, Castelo Branco, 
Casarano, Solofra and Aveiro-Viseu. Investigations 
by the national teams indicate that the development 
trajectories of these milieux vary widely. In the Irish 
case the development trajectory ¡s based upon link-
ing external investment with indigenous develop-
ment. Innovativeness rests upon internal synergy 
and employment development. But in the Spanish 
and some Portuguese examples, synergy and local 
employment growth rest upon innovativeness and 
productivity growth. The Italian experience is 
somewhere between the two. A number of milieux 
appear to be in a less favourable position, where 
development has rested upon protection through 
public intervention, or 'sheltered development'. 
These are: Andalucía, Barletta, Volos, Patra, Xanthi 
and Kastoria. The task of moving these milieux and 
areas with no milieux ¡n existence into a virtuous 
cycle offers opportunities for policy Interventions 
which are investigated further in Section 6. 
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Examples of innovative milieux experiencing 
a virtuous cycle 
Costa Smeralda 
The Costa Smeralda in Sardegna has, like Limerick-Shan-
non, developed on the basis of large external investments. 
However, in this instance a consortium developed by the 
Aga Khan has led to success based on tourism. External 
investment has encouraged the development of local 
entrepreneurship, both in the tourism sector itself, but also 
in related 'traditional' activities such as agriculture and food 
processing. The consortium has created important infra-
structural externalities for local firms, particularly in trans-
port and communications. It is argued that the large scale 
tourist development of the consortium acts as both a 
model and a school for independent local operators. 
Limerick-Shannon 
The development of this area has occurred under the 
direction of the Shannon Free Airport Development Com-
pany (SFADCO), which is responsible for industrial devel-
opment policy and implementation. Such regional respon-
sibility for development is rare in Ireland and accounts for 
much of the area's success. The international airport plays 
an important part in increasing the attractiveness of the 
area. The work of SFADCO promotes the integration of, 
and interaction between, a range of agencies, institutions 
and firms. These include the University of Limerick, Plas-
sey Technological Park and a number of electronic or com-
puter-based multinationals. New firm formation is also 
important. Linkages between the university and industry 
have been fostered by SFADCO and a range of organiza-
tions established. These include an Innovation Centre, a 
Marketing Centre for Small Business, an Innovation Board 
and an Entrepreneurship and High Technology Program-
me. All these institutional structures mesh together, largely 
through overlapping representation at board level, to help 
reduce uncertainty, promote innovation and create synergy. 
Informal contacts between individuals involved in these 
organizations and in industry are also important. 
Valencia 
Valencia's success rests upon the development of local 
industrial enterprises. The majority of these are based 
upon traditional sectors such as food, textiles, footwear 
and clothing and the area has a strong business tradition 
with entrepreneurs coming from families of craftsmen and 
tradesmen. In specific areas there are strong specializa-
tions of production, with almost industrial monoculture in 
some areas. Few barriers to entrepreneurship exist and 
success by some firms has spawned a process of imita-
tion. One of the strengths of the area is the high level of 
local savings and subsequent investment. Few entrepre-
neurs rely upon the financial markets to finance their busi-
nesses. Subcontracting and household work leads to a 
certain amount of firm interdependence, although such 
business interchange is not well developed. 
4.5 Conclusions 
From this statistical analysis of regional structure 
and its relationship to performance, a number of 
conclusions can be drawn. Structural factors did 
not provide statistically significant explanation of the 
performance of each region; correlation and regres-
sion analyses confirmed that structural factors may 
explain the level of regional GDP, but not the growth 
rate. However, the absence of an explanation deri-
ved from these statistical indicators necessitates an 
examination of the more intangible factors associa-
ted with Innovative milieux. 
The presence of a single asset or benefit does not ¡n 
itself encourage or prevent development. Thus, 
good road Infrastructure, a highly qualified labour 
force or low labour costs did not automatically lead to 
a good local performance. At the same time, a peri-
pheral location, or agricultural specialization did not in 
themselves prevent development opportunities. 
Short cuts or recipes for development do not exist; 
there is no single 'miracle ingredient' (e.g. infrastruc-
ture) which explains success or failure. Develop-
ment builds upon a multiplicity of preconditions that 
have to be present at the same time and that need 
to be creatively exploited by the region. There are 
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many different factors which make a region more 
competitive: 
• A favourable local business environment with 
good infrastructure, education, financial service pro-
vision and sound macro-economic policies. This is 
necessary but not sufficient, ¡n that a good environ-
ment does not cause development, but the lack 
thereof constrains it; 
• Specialization which leads to synergy between 
firms and, to some degree, to an innovative milieu. 
What should the role of policy be? Policy should 
aim to deal with the most pressing shortcomings of 
the regional business environment, i.e. to fill the 
gaps. The availability of human capital, infrastruc-
ture, services and entrepreneurship appear to be 
the decisive assets for a long term development 
strategy. Policy should also encourage coherency 
and synergy In the local economy, building on inno-
vative milieux where they exist. This means that 
regional assets and specificities should be Identified 
and exploited within a specific strategy (tourism in 
Sardegna, local enterprise in Valencia for example). 
The main question that then arises is whether the 
raw material for policy ¡s there, I.e. do the lagging 
regions have specificities which can be exploited, 
do they have the makings of Innovative milieux? 
Innovative milieux do exist In Objective 1 regions, but 
they are rare and Incipient. The macro-economic 
context and local framework affects their develop-
ment (for example, the backwardness of the social 
environment in Greece and the relative absence of 
local entrepreneurship and synergy in Ireland). Inno-
vative milieux were found within converging and 
mixed evidence regions. Encouragingly, some 
milieux were present ¡n diverging regions. There is 
therefore material for policy to build on. Provided 
that they are exploited coherently, some seemingly 
negative factors can play a positive role. For 
example, a peripheral location can have advantages 
for environmental protection and possible tourist 
development. 
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EC integration 
and development prospects 
5.1 Introduction 
So far, the preceding sections of this report have 
investigated the performance of the Objective 1 
regions over the 1980s with a view to identifying the 
prospects for development in the 1990s. In this 
section we consider how the completion of the 
Community's internal market will affect the lagging 
regions, and how this can be related to the analysis 
¡n previous sections. 
Four sets of Issues receive particular attention. In 
Section 5.2 we look at the main Issues for Objective 
1 regions that arise from Implementing the internal 
market measures, Section 5.3 contains a sectoral 
analysis and pays particular attention to the Impor-
tance of 'sensitive' sectors, Section 5.4 links the 
analysis to the development prospects for the 
Objective 1 regions and Section 5.5 deals with the 
impact of monetary union. 
5.2 The internal market programme 
While the internal market programme consists of 
over 300 individual measures for the completion of 
the internal market, the main issues facing Objective 
1 regions can be grouped into six categories. They 
Include: 
• the removal of border barriers; 
• the harmonization and mutual recognition of tech-
nical norms; 
• the opening up of public markets; 
• the liberalization of capital movements and finan-
cial services; 
• the free circulation of workers and their families; 
• the resultant increased industrial cooperation bet-
ween companies. 
Below, each of these issues is examined in turn to 
identify the likely impact upon the lagging regions. 
The removal of border barriers 
The removal of border barriers such as customs for-
malities and VAT regulation will have a positive 
impact upon the economies of all Objective 1 
regions. In particular, administrative and transport 
costs will be reduced for companies Involved in 
exporting. Small and medium-sized entreprises 
(SMEs) are likely to obtain the greatest benefits as 
the cost of customs formalities, for example, can be 
30-45% higher than for larger firms. The two major 
impacts on Objective 1 will occur in relation to 
export potential and inward investment. 
First, reduced barriers may encourage SMEs to 
expand their export capacity. Positive Impacts are 
expected in those countries and those regions 
where export activity is already high, such as the 
East and South East regions of Ireland, Valencia, 
Murcia, Centro, Lisboa, Puglia, Abruzzi, Campania 
and Sicilia. In a number of regions, though, the 
benefits generated by the removal of border formali-
ties are likely to be rather small. This is likely to be the 
case for regions such as the West and Mid West of 
Ireland where export sectors are dominated by large 
multinational companies which have already absor-
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bed many of the administrative costs. Also ¡n 
Greece, the measures will have less Impact partly 
because of the distance from European markets 
and because of the greater orientation to local and 
regional markets. 
There are also, of course, some direct threats asso-
ciated to the removal of border formalities. A parti-
cular challenge for a significant number of lagging 
regions is the suppression of Article 115 which 
allows Member States to introduce restrictions on 
Imports from outside the Community if these cause 
serious damage to their domestic Industry. Sectors 
likely to be particularly affected include textiles and 
clothing, footwear, agricultural produce and mecha-
nical engineering. These are activities where com-
petition from newly industrializing countries and 
Eastern Europe ¡s strong. Regions specialized in 
these production areas, such as Norte and Centro 
in Portugal, Valencia and Castilla La Mancha in 
Spain, Campania, Puglia and Molise in Italy and 
Central and Eastern Macedonia in Greece could be 
hit especially hard. 
On Inward investment, the suppression of trade 
barriers may affect in-movement of firms to these 
regions. Whether these measures positively increa-
se the lagging regions' accessibility or encourage 
firms to locate there will depend on the overall 
configuration of improved accessibility with factors 
such as infrastructure, market potential, labour qua-
lity and costs within individual countries. Few major 
impacts are expected in Greece, Italy, and Ireland. 
Spain is likely to be the major beneficiary, particular-
ly in Valencia, Murcia, Castilla Leon and, to a lesser 
extent, Andalucía. Both Spain and Portugal have 
benefited greatly ¡n recent years from substantial 
increases in foreign direct investment. It is important 
to note that such development has been concentra-
ted ¡n coastal areas, thus there is likely to be a diffe-
rential impact within regions. 
Harmonization and mutual 
recognition of standards 
These measures will have a relatively limited impact 
upon Objective 1 regions ¡n the short term. The rea-
sons for this are threefold. First, the lagging regions 
tend to specialize in sectors such as textiles and 
clothing where technical barriers are relatively unim-
portant. Second, Objective 1 firms are mainly orien-
ted towards their domestic markets, even ¡n sectors 
such as foodstuffs and construction where technical 
barriers are high. Finally, most firms in Objective 1 
have low levels of technological content or R&D 
Involvement. In the longer term pressures for 
modernization will result in improved product quality 
and competitive ability and engender a positive 
impact. However, for those Objective 1 regions 
unable to satisfy high Community standards or 
where services to help them meet such raised stan-
dards are lacking, harmonization could have nega-
tive consequences. 
The limited Impact of the measures was observed 
within the majority of the lagging regions with a few 
exceptions. Overall, the impact of harmonization 
measures is likely to have most impact in Italy. 
Three regions, Molise, Abruzzi and Campania have 
sectors with important technical barriers and high 
export levels (motor vehicles and telecommunica-
tions). Greek firms appear to be less than well pre-
pared for the harmonization of technical norms. 
Even in Attica and Central Greece, where the com-
paratively larger number of firms producing for 
export and with a higher technological content 
means that harmonization measures will have a 
greater Impact than elsewhere, company managers 
are paying little attention to the changes. 
Opening public procurement markets 
To date only 2% of the public markets for suppliers 
or works are awarded to extra-national firms. Open-
ing public procurement markets will engender two 
main processes. First, price differences between 
Member States will be reduced, as national sup-
pliers fall into line with the most competitive firms. 
Second, there will be a restructuring process as the 
number of producers is reduced and firms merge. 
In assessing the impact of these measures, it is 
important to make a distinction between traditional 
public markets (especially in construction Industry) 
and high technology public markets (such as com-
puting, office equipment, telecommunications and 
medical equipment). 
Objective 1 regions should be able to benefit from 
the expected reduction in the cost of public sup-
plies and works. At the same time, producers in 
Objective 1 regions are not likely to be greatly affec-
ted (either positively or negatively) by the opening 
up of advanced technology public procurement 
markets mainly because this type of activity remains 
concentrated within the core regions of the Com-
munity, with some exceptions such as Abruzzi, 
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Campania, Andalucía and Castilla la Mancha. 
However, the same is not true for those regions 
where traditional public procurement markets, pro-
tected by government, are important. Trade in such 
sectors is weak. Firms reliant on such markets are 
frequently in poor financial health, have low produc-
tivity levels and a weak technological capacity. 
Many firms in Objective 1 depend upon local and 
regional preference, but the opening up of markets 
and the end to regional preference are likely to lead 
to closure and/or take over of the market by more 
competitive firms. These processes will particularly 
affect Greece, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, the 
Mezzogiorno. Firms in the construction sector are 
likely to be especially affected by these develop-
ments, particularly for large-scale civil engineering 
projects. 
Freedom of capital movement 
Freeing capital movement is likely to result in greater 
competition to national banks from foreign entrants. 
The latter are likely to be more competitive and offer 
more diversified services. Freeing capital movements 
may also make local credit markets more vulnerable 
to competition. Furthermore, domestic savings may 
be reoriented towards the core countries of the 
Community In search of greater profitability than can 
be found locally. However, small local banks are un-
likely to disappear as they have advantages of local 
knowledge and demand. Some of these smaller 
banks may play an Important intermediary role bet-
ween the financial needs of SMEs and foreign 
banks. In total then, Objective 1 regions may gain a 
better quality of financial service at a lower cost. 
One negative feature common to many Objective 1 
regions could be the restructuring of, and potential 
job loss within, the domestic financial system. This 
will mainly affect capital city regions such as Dublin, 
Athens and Lisboa. Overall, Greece and Portugal will 
be most vulnerable for two main reasons. First, their 
capital markets are underdeveloped and second, 
their financial systems are split between a strongly 
concentrated national banking system which is not 
competitive, and foreign financial institutions oriented 
towards the growth sectors of these countries (the 
latter, however, have a poor presence in the periphe-
ral regions of these countries). In addition, their 
national banking systems are inefficiently organized 
and managed, and heavily involved in financing 
public sector firms, many of which are heavily in 
debt and unlikely to be profitable. Conversely, Spain 
and Ireland have either reorganized, or are ¡n the 
process of reorganizing, their financial systems to 
confront foreign competition. 
Free circulation of labour 
For Objective 1 there are two important aspects of 
the liberalization of labour: deregulation of the 
labour market and the potential exodus of qualified 
workers. The former may encourage further deve-
lopment of the black economy, but the latter ¡s the 
potentially most damaging consequence for Objec-
tive 1. A rapid loss of highly qualified workers could 
inhibit attempts to modernize the local economy. 
This ¡s especially likely to affect Ireland, where out-
migration has traditionally been to the United King-
dom, Australia and the USA, and the Lisboa and 
Norte regions of Portugal. With exception of Portu-
gal, it is not envisaged that there will be strong intra-
Community movements of unskilled workers, for 
cultural as well as economic reasons. Indeed, in 
Greece there has been a return of low qualified 
labour from other parts of the Community, notably 
Germany. Within some countries it is thought there 
may be internal movements of low qualified labour 
towards urban areas, as in Spain and Italy. 
Industrial cooperation 
Encouraging industrial cooperation across the 
Community aims to increase the realization of tech-
nical and non-technical scale economies and to 
decrease fragmentation of EC Industry, especially 
vis-à-vis the USA and Japan. Two main processes of 
industrial cooperation are envisaged. First, through 
Internalization which aims to increase concentration. 
Second, through encouraging contractual coopera-
tion agreements between firms. Industrial coopera-
tion across Europe is unlikely to have substantial 
Involvement by firms located in Objective 1. Such 
firms have a low technological content to their pro-
duct ranges, are oriented towards the home market, 
and are generally below the minimum efficient size 
threshold. Most Objective 1 firms will not benefit from 
movements towards merger between local firms. In 
some cases they may be Involved in merger with 
national or Community firms, especially where the lat-
ter can obtain advantages of technical know-how or 
brand names, for example in textiles, footwear and 
agricultural produce. 
Contractual Inter-firm relations are most likely to 
encompass three forms of Industrial cooperation: 
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first, in the technical field, where the major advan-
tages are in shared R&D operations; second, in the 
commercial field in order to enlarge market, share or 
achieve larger distribution networks; third, in the 
financial field in order to bring together capital need-
ed by all the partners. Only a few dynamic firms in 
Objective 1 regions are likely to be accepted Into 
strategic alliances, whether on a national or Com-
munity-wide scale. 
Across the Objective 1 countries the major benefit is 
likely to be felt within Spain. Even here there are dif-
ferential Impacts, with the greatest benefits felt in 
those regions with relatively qualified labour, low 
transport costs and reasonable infrastructure. In 
Spain, merger between local firms and national or 
Community firms is likely to be more important in 
the Mediterranean axis in Andalucía, Valencia and 
Murcia. Some moves in this direction have already 
occurred, especially by foreign firms seeking a 
share of the Spanish market. External investment in 
these regions is also strong. Other regions will see 
fewer advantages. With the exception of Lisboa, 
Portugal ¡s likely to experience only limited industrial 
cooperation. In Lisboa, foreign investment is predo-
minantly in the fields of finance, real estate and 
commerce. Similarly in Greece, acquisition by large 
Greek and European firms is limited, as is foreign 
investment. Both are largely confined to Attica and 
Central Greece. 
5.3 Sectoral impacts 
While the measures examined so far will have an 
impact upon the entire economic fabric of the 
Objective 1 regions, implementing the internal mar-
ket will have a differential impact upon specific 
industrial sectors. In particular, some sectors have 
been judged to be particularly 'sensitive' to the 
effects of the 1992 programme. In this section, we 
assess the extent to which regional economies are 
more or less sensitive to the internal market pro-
gramme on two counts. First, on the basis of the 
relative importance of the sensitive sectors in the 
economic fabric of the Objective 1 regions, and 
second on the basis of the competitiveness of 
these same sensitive sectors. 
A substantial amount of work in this area has been 
undertaken by Buigues, llzkovitz and Lebrun (see 
Commission of the European Communities, 1990, 
The impact of the internal market by industrial sec-
tor: The challenge for the member states, Directora-
te-General for Economic and Financial Affairs/Direc-
torate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations 
and Social Affairs) who examined the manufacturing 
sector of the Community. While manufacturing only 
accounts for between 15-30% of GDP in Member 
States, Industrial products account for a major 
share of exports of goods and services. In total, 
manufactured goods comprise almost 70% of total 
trade between Member States. In this section we 
draw upon this analysis, as well as upon our own 
calculations which attempted to regionalize this 
analysis. This proved to be difficult due to substan-
tial problems with the regional data. 
Of 120 industrial sectors considered by Buigues, 
llzkovitz and Lebrun, 40 were identified as being 
currently protected by non-tariff barriers, or where 
barriers prevent the exploitation of economies of 
scale, or where barriers allow the retention of price 
discrepancies between Member States. It was 
thought that these sectors would be particularly 
'sensitive' to the completion of the internal market 
when such barriers are removed. Buigues, llzkovitz 
and Lebrun Identified a number of characteristics of 
'sensitive sectors', reflecting their degree of open-
ness to Community trade, and their tendency to 
support price differences between Member States -
for identical products. Typical characteristics were: 
high technology public procurement markets or 
sectors where demand is growing rapidly and 
where technological content is high, such as tele-
communications, medical equipment and informa-
tics; traditional or regulated public procurement 
sectors; and sectors with moderate non-tariff bar-
riers, including activities where technical, adminis-
trative or fiscal barriers still exist but where wide 
price differentials remain. 
In addition, at the national level, each Member State 
was inspected to see whether there were sectors 
which, due to specific national characteristics, 
would be 'sensitive' to 1992 although they had not 
been included in the list of 40 sectors identified at 
Community level. For example, some sectors were 
Included because of the presence of Important non-
tariff barriers in one Member State only, such as 
knitwear in Greece which receives significant export 
subsidies in that country. Some sectors were elimi-
nated from the sensitive list because they are Insi-
gnificant for that Member State, such as the wine 
sector in Ireland. 
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Table 5.1: 
Portugal 
Greece 
Germany 
Italy 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
UK 
Denmark 
Spain 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
EUR 12 
Share of sensitive sectors 
Share in 
manufacturing 
employment 
68% 
62% 
57% 
52% 
5 1 % 
50% 
50% 
49% 
48% 
47% 
45% 
53% 
in employment and value added in 
Share in 
total 
employment 
17% 
11% 
18% 
12% 
1 1 % 
12% 
11% 
10% 
11% 
9% 
8% 
13% 
Share in 
manufacturing 
value added 
60% 
57% 
60% 
50% 
53% 
49% 
53% 
42% 
49% 
6 1 % 
47% 
54% 
1987 
Share in 
total 
value added 
16% 
9% 
18% 
12% 
1 1 % 
10% 
12% 
7% 
12% 
14% 
9% 
13% 
Source; Buigues, llzkovitz and Lebrun (1990) and DG XVI calculations. 
Subsequently, the sensitivity of the sectors identified 
in each Member State was assessed by each natio-
nal expert, by estimating the impact which the 
removal of non-tariff barriers could have. Important 
changes were made to the list of sensitive sectors 
for Portugal, Greece and Spain. Generally, the sec-
tors added to the list In these countries are subsec-
tors of the textiles, food-processing and car indus-
tries. Overall, 'sensitive sectors' were found to be 
important in the economies of the Objective 1 coun-
tries (see Table 5.1 above). 
Table 5.1 reveals that the sensitive sectors account 
for over 50% of both manufacturing employment and 
value added, and 13% of total employment and GDP 
for the Community as a whole. For the Objective 1 
Member States, the sensitive sectors account for 
higher than average manufacturing employment (Por-
tugal and Greece) and manufacturing value added 
(Portugal, Greece and Ireland). 
Following the identification of the sensitive sectors 
and examination of their relative importance within 
Portugal 
Greece 
Germany 
Italy 
France 
Table 5.2: 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
UK 
Denmark 
Spain 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
EUR 12 
Relative strength of weak and strong sensitive sectors 
Share ¡n manufacturing 
employment 
Weak sectors 
16% 
18% 
4% 
13% 
14% 
10% 
16% 
12% 
17% 
15% 
16% 
12% 
Strong sectors 
29% 
19% 
38% 
28% 
23% 
22% 
16% 
30% 
14% 
23% 
22% 
26% 
Share in manufacturing 
value added 
Weak sectors 
24% 
22% 
5% 
22% 
17% 
13% 
2 1 % 
na 
na 
na 
17% 
14% 
Strong sectors 
15% 
18% 
27% 
26% 
16% 
24% 
2 1 % 
na 
na 
na 
28% 
23% 
Source: Buigues, llzkovitz and Lebrun (1990) and own calculations. 
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Member States, Buigues, llzkovitz and Lebrun 
assessed the competitive position of each of the 
sectors. This was undertaken by looking at the pre-
sent trade performance of each Member State in 
each sensitive sector. On the basis of four indicators 
relating to the export performance and specialization 
in the period 1985-87, the sensitive sectors of each 
country were classified Into three groups: those sec-
tors where Member States have a competitive 
advantage (deemed 'strong' sectors); those sectors 
where Member States are at a disadvantage ('weak' 
sectors); and those sectors which are 'balanced'. In 
our analysis we focused upon the differential bet-
ween strong and weak sectors to try and determine 
the competitive strengths of regions. Table 5.2 
divides manufacturing employment and value added 
¡n the sensitive sectors into their weak and strong 
proportions. Buigues, llzkovitz and Lebrun comple-
mented this static analysis by examining historical 
trends and made adjustments for the current dyna-
mism of sectors. We now turn to an analysis by 
Member State to examine the competitiveness of the 
Objective 1 regions as a consequence of 1992. 
Greece 
In total, Greek manufacturing is composed of more 
sensitive sectors than the EC average (see Table 
5.1). Greece has 62% of manufacturing employ-
ment and 57% of value added in the sensitive sec-
tors. However, the share of manufacturing in the 
Greek economy is relatively low. In consequence, 
the Greek sensitive sectors have a relatively lower 
weight in total employment and GDP. 
performance. In total, 33.8% of employment in 
manufacturing fell into this deteriorating category. 
Only a minority of sectors, accounting for 17.4% of 
all manufacturing employment, Improved their posi-
tion. Moreover, of the seven strong sensitive sectors 
in Greece, four experienced a deterioration in their 
competitive position over the 1980s (accounting for 
11.4% of manufacturing employment). Only one 
strong sensitive sector improved its competitive 
position significantly (accounting for 5.3% of manu-
facturing employment). Of the 38 sectors designat-
ed as 'balanced' or 'weak', 20 experienced a dete-
rioration in their competitive position in the 1980s 
(22.4% of manufacturing employment). Only 10 
sectors of the 38 improved their competitive situa-
tion (12.1% of manufacturing employment). Indeed, 
with very few exceptions, the only sectors showing 
some improvement over the 1980s were those 
which are not very important to the Greek economy. 
Virtually all the sectors which are important for the 
Greek economy performed badly. 
It is worth noting that a large proportion of the 
strong and balanced sensitive sectors is made up 
of textiles, clothing and footwear industries. These 
are low technology, labour-intensive sectors which 
are under threat from low-cost producers ¡n Eastern 
Europe and South East Asia. Most of these sectors 
had a poor performance over the 1980s, which 
does not bode well for the impact of 1992. Mean-
while, virtually all the modern, sensitive industrial 
sectors are weak. With the exception of food indus-
tries, nearly all the Greek consumer goods sectors 
are weak. 
In terms of the competitive position of the sensitive 
sectors, the Buigues, llzkovitz and Lebrun static 
analysis reveals that the employment share of 
strong sectors (19%) ¡n Greece is virtually equal to 
that of weak sectors (18%) (see Table 5.2). When 
analysed in terms of value added, the share of 
strong sectors (18%) is lower than the weak sectors 
(22%). This contrasts with the position for the EC as 
a whole, where the employment share of strong 
sectors (26%) is more than twice as large as the 
weaker sectors (12%). In Greece, the strong sectors 
are dominated by the textiles, clothing and footwear 
Industries. These sectors together account for 
15.6% of employment and 12.1% of value added. 
The historic performance of the sensitive sectors in 
trade terms over the 1980s was poor. Most of the 
sensitive sectors experienced a deterioration in their 
In summary then, Greek Industry is likely to be sen-
sitive to the impact of the single market, even 
though the relatively low importance of manufactu-
ring ¡n Greece in total will help to mitigate these 
impacts. A very large proportion of Greek sensitive 
sectors are in a weak competitive position and even 
the strong sectors have been performing badly in 
the 1980s. As noted, these strong sectors are 
concentrated in Industries which will be subject to 
competition from lower-cost producers outside 
Western Europe. The overall prospects for industrial 
activity in Greece as a consequence of 1992 appear 
bleak. 
With regard to the regional situation, the share of 
sensitive sectors is particularly high in Attica, Cen-
tral Greece and Central Macedonia (accounting for 
between 22-24% of total employment) and is only 
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low in the islands and the Peleponnese. Poor regio-
nal data preclude an analysis in terms of weak and 
strong sectors. 
Spain 
Compared to the Community as a whole, Spain has 
a lower overall share of sensitive sectors in manu-
facturing employment (48%) and total employment 
(11%). Table 5.1 indicates that this is also true In 
terms of value added. With regard to the competi-
tive position of Spain's sensitive sectors, figures are 
only available for employment (Table 5.2). These 
reveal that Spain has a higher than average propor-
tion of sensitive sectors in a weak competitive posi-
tion, and a lower than average proportion in a 
strong position. It Is worth noting that due to data 
problems Buigues, llzkovitz and Lebrun limited their 
analysis of competitiveness to the initial 40 sectors 
(which account for 40% of manufacturing employ-
ment) rather than the total list of sensitive sectors 
for Spain (which account for some 48% of manu-
facturing employment). 
By comparison with total manufacturing activity, the 
40 sensitive sectors ¡n Spain were found to be more 
open to international trade and more vulnerable to 
external competition. While the EC Is the major trad-
ing partner for Spain, the trade flow with other 
countries is also high, especially In the sensitive 
sectors. The sensitive sectors also exhibit higher 
labour productivity and labour cost than is the case 
for total manufacturing. Since accession to the EC 
Spain's manufacturing imports, especially in the 
most sensitive sectors, have increased as a conse-
quence of a drastic reduction in protective meas-
ures, particularly high tariff and indirect restrictions. 
This helps to account for the rather unexpected 
dominance of weak sectors in Spain. In addition, 
the recovery of the Spanish economy and the 
appreciation of the peseta in the period 1985-87 
also contributed to a worsening manufacturing 
trade balance. Thus, some sensitive sectors which 
were relatively strong before accession to the EC 
(pharmaceuticals, machine tools, shipbuilding) are 
now in the weak category, indicating that their com-
petitive position largely rested upon high trade bar-
riers. 
At the regional level, sensitive sectors account for a 
higher than average proportion of manufacturing 
employment in Valencia and Castilla La Mancha. 
Andalucía and Castilla Leon also contain high pro-
portions. Conversely, there are much lower than 
average shares of sensitive sectors ¡n Canarias and 
Galicia. As Table 5.2 shows, for Spain as a whole 
weak sectors account for a higher proportion of 
manufacturing employment than strong sectors. 
This is also the case for most Spanish Objective 1 
regions, apart from Castilla Leon, where the situa-
tion is balanced, and Valencia, where strong sectors 
dominate. Rising foreign direct investment may help 
to improve productivity, competitiveness and trade 
performance in the Spanish regions, but it is worth 
noting that the majority of this goes to the non-
Objective 1 regions around Madrid and Barcelona. 
Portugal 
Portugal has a higher proportion of manufacturing 
employment in the sensitive sectors (68%) than any 
other Member State (see Table 5.1). While its share 
is lower when measured in terms of value added 
(60%), this is still above the EC average. This dis-
crepancy between value added and employment 
suggests that Portuguese sensitive sectors are 
labour Intensive and have low productivity com-
pared to the rest of the manufacturing industry. In 
total, Portugal's Industry shows a marked polariza-
tion between a limited number of strong sensitive 
sectors and a large number of weak sectors. 
Strong sensitive sectors are slightly more important 
in Portugal (29%) than for the EC (26%) as a whole, 
¡n terms of manufacturing employment. However, 
the position is reversed in terms of value added. A 
large proportion of the Portuguese sensitive sectors 
are in a weak competitive position and even the 
strong sectors have been performing badly in the 
1980s. As with Greece, these strong sectors are 
concentrated in traditional, low technology, labour-
intensive industries which will be vulnerable ¡n the 
medium to long term to competition from low cost 
producers outside the EC. Excluding the limited 
number of more advanced sectors such as Insula-
ted wires and cables, Portugal's strong sectors 
Include knitwear, ready-made clothing, household 
textiles and footwear. Such sectors have been com-
petitive because of low wage costs and the wides-
pread use of flexible work practices, including 
home-working and limited employment contracts. 
As in Spain, Portugal's sensitive sectors have been 
protected by tariff barriers and they are vulnerable 
to competition. This is especially true of foodstuffs 
which may need substantial restructuring if the 
industry is to survive in the single market. The over-
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all prospects of Portugal in the light of 1992 therefo-
re appear to be poor. 
Potential sensitivity to the internal market varies by 
region. There is a low proportion of sensitive sectors 
¡n Algarve, where they account for only approxima-
tely 5% of total employment. Conversely, much 
greater shares of sensitive sector employment are 
found in Norte (up to 27% of total employment) and 
Lisboa. Centro, Alentejo and Norte are in a relatively 
balanced position as regards competitiveness. The 
sensitive sectors in Centro and Alentejo largely 
consist of ceramics, while in Norte textiles and cloth-
ing predominate. In Lisboa weak sensitive sectors 
are much more prominent than strong sensitive 
sectors. 
Italy 
Table 5.1 reveals that Italy's share of sensitive sec-
tors ¡n terms of both employment and value added 
is similar to the Community average. In relation to 
the competitiveness of these sensitive sectors, 
Table 5.2 reveals that overall, Italy has a slightly 
higher than average proportion of sectors in a 
strong competitive position in terms of manufactu-
ring employment. In terms of value added, Italian 
sensitive sectors show a strong dichotomy between 
weak and strong sensitive sectors. In addition to the 
40 sensitive sectors, Buigues, llzkovitz and Lebrun 
identify three additional important sectors which will 
be affected by the single market: the automotive 
sector, motor cycles and textiles and clothing. In 
addition to the direct impacts upon these sectors 
there are also important secondary effects transmit-
ted through inter-industry linkage to sectors such as 
parts and accessories for motor vehicles and weav-
ing, spinning and man-made fibres. 
However, despite the important potential impact of 
the single market upon Italian industry the effects in 
the Objective 1 regions will be limited. In few of 
Italy's Objective 1 regions do the sensitive sectors 
account for a large proportion of regional employ-
ment and none have a higher share of total employ-
ment than the national average. Sardegna, Sicilia, 
Basilicata and Calabria ¡n particular appear to be 
much less sensitive to the impacts in 1992, as in all 
four regions the sensitive sectors account for less 
than 5% of total employment. In other regions of 
Abruzzi, Puglia and Campania, the share of sensi-
tive sectors is still relatively low. Strong sectors are 
more prominent than weak sectors in Abruzzi and 
Puglia, while Campania has a more balanced situa-
tion. 
Abruzzi and Campania have a slightly higher pro-
portion of employment accounted for by the sensi-
tive sectors. Campania (automobiles and telecom-
munications) and Molise (automobiles) have a large 
proportion of their sensitive sectors in a weak com-
petitive position. Basilicata, Puglia and Abruzzi have 
a high proportion of strong sensitive sectors (cloth-
ing in all three regions, as well as chemical products 
in Basilicata). Campania, as well as having a high 
proportion of weak sensitive sectors, also has a 
high proportion of strong sensitive sectors 
(clothing, footwear and chemicals). 
Ireland 
In employment terms, the Irish economy Is less sen-
sitive to 1992 than the Community average (see 
Table 5.1). However, ¡n terms of value added ¡n 
manufacturing (61 %) it is more sensitive than the 
EC as a whole (54%). A large proportion of the sen-
sitive sectors are dominated by multinational enter-
prises and, as a consequence, a large proportion of 
value added can be rapidly withdrawn from Ireland 
in the form of repatriated profits. It is therefore 
thought that employment shares better represent 
the importance of the sensitive sectors to the Irish 
economy. 
The employment share of strong sensitive sectors in 
Ireland (23% of all manufacturing employment) is lar-
ger than weak sensitive sectors (15%). The strong 
sectors are dominated by multinationals in Industries 
such as pharmaceuticals, office machinery, telecom-
munications, medical equipment and domestic 
appliances (in total, these account for 14.9% of all 
manufacturing employment). In addition, some food 
sectors are also strong, and these account for an 
additional 7.9% of manufacturing employment. But 
in relation to the weak and balanced sensitive sec-
tors, many of these strong sectors are 'incomplete': 
that is, they produce only a small part of the total 
product range of the broader sector. 
Overall, the historic trade performance of the sensi-
tive sectors was strong in the 1980s. Most sensitive 
sectors (accounting for 36.7% of all manufacturing 
employment) experienced an improvement in their 
performance. Conversely, only for a minority of sec-
tors (accounting for 7.4% of all manufacturing 
employment) did performance deteriorate. In total, of 
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the 11 strong sectors, 9 Improved their performance 
in the 1980s. Of the 28 weak or balanced sectors, 
only 11 experienced a deteriorating competitive posi-
tion. Indeed, the majority improved their position. 
It is worth nothing that some 56% of employment in 
the Irish sensitive sectors is contained within for-
eign-owned firms, compared to only 40% for all 
manufacturing Industry. This implies that the sensi-
tive sectors are probably stronger ¡n International 
markets than other sectors of Irish manufacturing 
Industry. This could mean that the effect of 1992 will 
be to exacerbate the problems of the dual Irish eco-
nomy outlined in Chapter 3. 
nal average. The impact of 1992 is likely to be great-
er in the North East, especially given the higher pro-
portion of manufacturing employment accounted 
for by the sensitive sectors in this region. Both the 
Midlands and the East region have a relatively low 
share of sensitive sectors, and the East region is 
much less sensitive to the impact of 1992, largely 
due to the high degree of employment ¡n services 
and public administration. 
5.4 The impact of the internal market 
on Objective 1 
In conclusion then, it would seem that Ireland ¡s not 
particularly sensitive to the impacts of the single 
market. The majority of the sensitive sectors are in a 
strong competitive position and have been impro-
ving that position over the 1980s. Additionally, the 
strong points of the manufacturing economy are 
those where demand is growing rapidly. Ireland 
should therefore be well placed to take advantage 
of 1992 and the main risks are further dualization of 
the manufacturing economy. 
It has proved difficult to Identify accurately which of 
the Objective 1 regions will gain from the Internal 
market programme and which will lose out, given 
the wide range of measures and potential res-
ponses. Despite this, it is possible to come to some 
general conclusions as to the future prospects of 
the Objective 1 regions. We identified two main 
categories of lagging regions on the basis of their 
sensitivity to the impact of 1992 and their competi-
tive position. 
A fairly low level of regional employment is accoun-
ted for by the sensitive sectors. Only in the North 
East is the share appreciably greater than the natio-
First, there are regions which are dominated by 
labour Intensive sectors. The removal of non-tariff 
barriers may encourage firms in these sectors to 
Table 5.3: Past performance and future prospects 
Weak sectors 
dominating 
Strong sectors 
dominating 
Balanced position 
Relatively 
unaffected by 
1992 programme 
Converging 
Murcia 
Andalucía 
Castilla La Mancha 
Lisboa 
e Vale do Tejo 
East Macedonia 
Valencia 
Ireland 
Abruzzi 
Norte 
Molise 
Canarias 
Crete 
South Aegean Isles 
Ionian Isles 
Mixed evidence 
Extremadura 
Puglia 
Castilla Leon 
Centro 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
Galicia 
Diverging 
Asturias 
Central Macedonia 
Attica 
Central Greece 
Western Greece 
Epirus 
West Macedonia 
Thessalla 
Campania 
Peleponnese 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
North Aegean Isles 
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increase production in areas where they have a 
competitive advantage. Such firms could improve 
internal capacity, introduce process innovation and 
concentrate upon the domestic market. This scena-
rio has a number of short-term benefits for the 
regions concerned as non-tariff barriers are lifted, 
but In the longer term such regions will face compe-
tition from lower labour cost developing and Eastern 
European countries. Objective 1 regions in this 
category are: Extremadura, Norte, Algarve, Central 
and Eastern Macedonia, Thessaly, Eastern Greece 
and the Greek islands. 
Second, there are regions where the industrial 
structure ¡s dominated mainly by capital and/or 
research-intensive sectors. In these sectors scale 
economies are achievable consequent upon the 
removal of non-tariff barriers. Firms ¡n such regions 
could concentrate upon product differentiation and 
increased investment in R&D. While this appears to 
be a positive development, in many Objective 1 
regions this rests upon foreign direct investment by 
multinational companies in the advanced sectors of 
the economy. Regions in this category were identi-
fied as: Asturias, Castilla Leon, Lisboa, Alentejo, 
Molise and Mid West (Ireland). 
These two categories largely accord with Buigues, 
llzkovitz and Lebrun's two potential development 
scenarios of inter-Industry specialization, where 
Member States specialize ¡n those sectors for which 
they have a comparative and competitive advanta-
ge, and intra-industry specialization, where specia-
lization occurs within industries, and industrial pro-
duction in the Objective 1 Member States becomes 
similar to that in the most developed Member 
States. The evidence would suggest that Ireland 
has followed the latter path, and that Spain ¡s 
making significant progress towards achieving this. 
The longer-term outlook for some regions in Portu-
gal ' and especially Greece looks bleak, given their 
reliance upon labour ' Intensive traditional sectors 
with low technology content such as clothing, tex-
tiles and footwear. Combining the analysis of the 
impact of the internal market programme with the 
earlier categorization into converging and diverging 
regions produces the results shown ¡n Table 5.3 
above. 
5.5 Monetary union 
The development prospects for Objective 1 regions 
during this decade will be strongly influenced by the 
advent of other measures being taken for the inte-
gration of the European Community. The creation of 
the EMS has begun to lead to a convergence of 
Interest rates and wage levels across the Commun-
ity. While this has benefits, in that it creates a sound 
macro-economic environment across the Communi-
ty, it will have serious effects upon some Objective 1 
regions during a transitory period. In adopting fixed 
exchange rates countries abandon the option of alte-
ring the value of their national currency. This is impor-
tant because exchange rate flexibility enables a coun-
try to compensate for a loss of international competi-
tiveness. There is evidence, for example, that both 
Greece and Portugal have relied heavily ¡n the past 
upon devaluation ¡n order to assist their industries. 
The loss of this important policy instrument could 
place Objective 1 regions in a position of 'absolute 
disadvantage'. This is serious given that other factors 
which are most important for success once a mon-
etary union is established, such as skill attainments, 
technological capabilities, sophisticated services and 
complex networks of cooperation, are in short supply 
¡n many of the worst-off Objective 1 regions. 
In both Ireland and Spain, the movement into higher 
skilled and higher technology Industries has come 
about through high levels of foreign direct investment. 
While this scenario has a number of advantages, it 
also has Its risks — as the case of Ireland Illustrates. 
The risks come with the development of a dual eco-
nomy, split between reliance upon foreign multinatio-
nals In the expanding, high-technology sectors and a 
domestic sector confined to traditional industries. 
However, adopting an inter-industry specialization 
strategy risks future competition from developing 
countries with cheaper labour costs and potentially 
greater adjustment costs at some future date. 
While the longer term benefits of a sound macro-
economic framework are certain, the transition diffi-
culties could be considerable for some Member 
States and Objective 1 regions. Development related 
expenditure will need to be maintained while budget 
deficits, debt ratios and inflation rates are brought 
into line with macro-economic performance targets. 
Fiscal consolidation and high real interest rates, if 
required, must not endanger private Investment and 
business confidence. The Community and its Mem-
ber States will need to manage carefully the goal of 
simultaneously converging in both real and nominal 
economic terms. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
It is worth reiterating the point that it is difficult to 
predict precisely which regions will win and which 
lose from further integration. However, from the 
analysis in this section it is possible to formulate 
some tentative general conclusions as to the devel-
opment prospects of the Objective 1 regions in the 
light of the progress towards economic and mon-
etary union. 
• One problem is that the scale of the investment 
needed might not be forthcoming from national 
sources in a transition period, due to the disciplines 
imposed by monetary union. Here, there are impor-
tant implications for the Structural Fund interven-
tions. 
• There is a diversity of experience in the different 
regions. Contrary to what is sometimes argued, 
sensitive sectors are strongly represented in some 
lagging regions, while In others their share of total 
employment is minimal. 
• There are substantial differences in sensitivity bet-
ween Member States. In particular, some Greek and 
Portuguese regions contain high proportions of sen-
sitive sectors (although even here there are regions 
with low proportions), while the Italian Objective 1 
regions contain very low proportions of sensitive 
sectors. 
• There are also substantial differences ¡n the per-
formance of the sensitive sectors ¡n different Mem-
ber States. In some countries they have had a good 
performance in the 1980s, in others this was not 
the case. 
• The industrial structure of the Objective 1 regional 
economies differs from that of the more developed 
Member States. In particular, Portugal and Greece 
are less well Integrated and rely upon ¡nter-lndustry 
specialization in labour Intensive, low technology 
sectors. 
• The likely impact of 1992 upon Greek and Portu-
guese regions is to encourage further inter-industry 
specialization in sectors such as textiles, clothing 
and footwear. In the short term this may have 
advantages, but in the longer term these sectors 
will be subject to competition from developing 
countries and future adjustment costs will be high. 
• There ¡s therefore a need to modernize the Objecti-
ve 1 economies, with large-scale Investments need-
ed to close Infrastructure and knowledge gaps and 
thus enable the upgrading of their economies and 
a move towards an intra-industry development 
scenario. 
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A policy for Objective 1 regions 
in the 1990s 
6.1 The new context 
In this chapter, the findings of the previous chapters 
are brought together and a number of policy 
conclusions are drawn. The first chapters of this 
report provide renewed confirmation of the exist-
ence of considerable regional disparities within the 
Community and that, overall, very little progress has 
been made towards reducing the disparities during 
the 1980s. This global picture however, disguises a 
much more complex reality. In fact three broad 
categories of region can be distinguished — those 
which are converging in terms of their economic 
performance (approximately 40% of the Objective 1 
population or around 9% of total Community popu-
lation), those which are clearly diverging still further 
from the Community average (just over one quarter 
of the Objective 1 population or some 6% of Com-
munity population) and those which are stationary in 
relative terms with no clear trend ¡n either direction. 
In subsequent chapters this report reviews the 
explanatory power of economic theory and empiri-
cal analysis. It concludes that while many insights 
can be obtained, none of the theoretical or empirical 
explanations offers an explanation of general appli-
cation — some observations can be explained with 
reference to them, but many others cannot. Thus 
there is no general theory or explanation of the 
reduction in regional disparities on which standard 
policy prescriptions can be confidently based 
throughout the Community. 
While there is no general theory or explanation, 
there is, nevertheless, a prevailing climate of opinion 
which emphasizes the need for a broadly based 
approach. For the potential benefits of closer eco-
nomic and monetary union to be realized, there are 
basic preconditions to be met in terms of infrastruc-
ture endowment and human capabilities. Secondly, 
there must be an export base within the region, 
and, moreover, one which can'benefit from market 
widening. Thirdly, a region must have production 
vocations or specificities which are not based on 
low labour cost alone, but also on local know-how 
as well as on natural resource endowments. Finally, 
and very importantly, a region must have an entre-
preneurial culture and a political and social organi-
zation which is sympathetic to that culture. 
In the 1990s, a new policy context ¡s being created. 
Closer economic and monetary union should re-
duce the importance of national differences and 
increase the importance of regional differences. 
During the transition period to economic and mon-
etary union, the liberalization of markets, and the 
general economic conditions resulting from the 
effort to restore macro-economic equilibrium, may 
reduce both public and private investment in the 
lagging regions. Within an economic and monetary 
union, in which there are fixed exchange rates, 
regions can suffer from an absolute disadvantage in 
the international division of labour, and some could 
progressively drop out of the Community and world 
economy. They would become increasingly depen-
dent on financial transfers and on the non-respect 
of the economic and social rules generally prevailing 
elsewhere for the maintenance of activity and 
employment. 
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In periods of rapid economic growth, disparities 
between strong and weak regions can be disguised 
by the transfer of part of the surplus generated by 
the more competitive sectors and regions for in-
come support in the weaker regions. In times of 
slower growth, and pervasive employment crisis, 
the political and economic cost of such transfers 
will be higher. The Community has also to take 
account of the needs of the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. That ¡s why the pressure for a 
clear demonstration of value for money in terms of 
the Structural Funds' development impact on the 
performance of the regional economy and not just 
in terms of income support, is much greater than in 
the previous decade. At the same time, this 
demonstration is complicated by the absence of 
any agreed policy consensus, or recipe for develop-
ment, against which the development impact of 
transfers can be tested 'ex ante', and by means of 
which the experience as it unfolds can be assessed 
in an agreed way. 
ambition and the practical organization put in place 
to achieve that ambition. To warn finally, those who 
are at risk of diverging, and above all, those who are 
clearly diverging, of the likely medium-term conse-
quences of a failure to turn round the situation: the 
risk, in short, of a growing dependency on transfers 
from outside. 
Of course, it is disappointing that it is only a minority 
of regions which are successfully converging at pre-
sent, but it is also encouraging that within that fam-
ily of converging regions, there is a great diversity of 
situations. In other words, there is no fatality of 
divergence because a region is predominantly rural, 
or because a region is relatively peripheral, or even 
because a region belongs to a Member State in 
which macro-economic disequillbrla persist. Never-
theless, while regions can improve their situation 
even in the most adverse contexts, it is obviously 
desirable that improvements be made to that 
context. 
6.2 Regional development policy 
in the 1990s 
The challenge for the 1990s is: 
a) to maintain the momentum of convergence in the 
successful regions; 
b) to attempt to 'turn around' the situation in the 
stationary or diverging regions; 
Maintaining the momentum of convergence implies 
continued progress towards reducing reliance on 
lower labour costs and labour-intensive production. 
Regions must progressively establish the type of 
intra-industry specialization typical of more advan-
ced European areas, and develop advanced niches 
within their traditional specialist sectors. The same 
approach applies to specialization In market ser-
vices, tourism in particular. Unit labour cost advan-
tages should be maintained through productivity 
increases rather than through wage compression. 
but in a political, economic and social context which 
is likely to be much more difficult than in the second 
part of the 1980s, and with very little theoretical or 
empirical underpinning for policy. 
Given that there are no standard policy recipes on 
offer, the fundamental aim of Community policy 
must be to advise, to encourage, and to warn. To 
advise, first of all, on the lessons of successful 
experience elsewhere, on the creation or consolida-
tion of technical and organizational capabilities at 
the local, regional and national level, and more 
generally on the effective management, piloting and 
assessment of development efforts. Secondly, to 
encourage the setting of clear and transparent 
goals expressing a credible and achievable ambition 
to reduce disparities in specified ways so as to pre-
pare for closer economic and monetary union, and 
to provide financial support commensurate with the 
But not all regions will be able to develop capabili-
ties for innovation from internal resources. Innova-
tion is a product of a wide range of factors and 
advantages which are difficult to influence through 
public policy. Innovation may be inherently spatially 
imbalanced and there are limits to what can be 
expected from an innovation-oriented regional poli-
cy. It is also important not to overemphasize the role 
of local forces and actors, and not to underestimate 
the importance of the global economic context. 
Regional development may be Influenced by indi-
genous forces but these do not mean that a region 
can be shielded from the impact, positive or nega-
tive, of wider economic and political forces. 
For this second category of regions, greater empha-
sis could be put on external investment as the main 
catalyst for local economic development. Such a 
policy will need to be based on a realistic and 
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objective analysis of the attractivness of the region 
concerned to external investors, and steps should 
be taken to Improve the attractiveness in conse-
quence. Moreover, for this to be successful as a 
means of stimulating local development, determi-
ned attempts must be made to deliberately embed 
external investment into the local environment. 
Regions can bargain with external firms over mat-
ters such as co-operation in vocational and mana-
gerial training, joint development and implementa-
tion of infrastructure projects, and assistance in 
creating a local network of subcontractors. 
The fundamental aim is to put regions on the vir-
tuous path to growth, combining both productivity 
growth and employment growth. This implies, in 
addition to promoting productive activity, a large 
degree of continuity in investment in basic econo-
mic infrastructures. Some new directions are never-
theless required for the 1990s. These are a still 
stronger accent on Improving human capabilities; 
where appropriate, a reform of the institutional 
framework within which policy is designed and 
implemented; and thirdly the full provision and free 
circulation of information of all kinds. 
and broad band technologies, a more appropriate 
route, especially in the lagging regions, would be to 
build upon existing skills and techniques, such as 
accessing information through narrow band techno-
logies. Demonstration projects should be supported 
at the local level, and the lessons learnt from these 
spread out to all lagging regions. 
As part of this exercise, regions should ensure that 
policy success is measurable, that results are regu-
larly monitored, and that the public and political 
authorities are regularly informed of progress. For 
example, an aim such as developing regional entre-
preneurial strengths needs to be translated into a 
form which can be monitored. Regions need to ask 
if this should be numbers of new firms created, the 
establishment of venture capital funds, numbers of 
trainees passing through business development 
courses or some other measure. A determined 
effort should be made to inform and involve the pri-
vate sector and general public in the public sectors' 
development policy, and especially to ensure full 
Information on the various grant systems or other 
forms of support available. Openness and transpar-
ency are key words for public policy in the 1990s. 
A crucial policy theme should be the provision of 
information. Information is one of the key factors in 
creating interaction between local and external eco-
nomic forces; in networking between firms and ins-
titutions; and more generally in successfully adap-
ting to changing markets and technological environ-
ments. Information can come in several forms. It 
can be Internal to the region, for example, in provid-
ing detail of new technologies or spare production 
capacity. It can help to link the regional economy to 
the broader national, Community and world econo-
my, for example, through linking firms to markets or 
through accessing databases. Finally, it can be 
information about the area, helping to Improve 
external perceptions of the region, and hence to 
encourage inward Investment or other forms of 
partnership with economically stronger regions. 
How information provision and interchange is orga-
nized and provided are vital questions in the devel-
opment process. There ¡s a role for specialized 
intermediaries to play, helping to put individuals, 
firms and institutions in contact with appropriate 
information. There is a role for the use of technology 
both to provide and access information. While there 
may be a case for a 'high technology showcase' in 
some areas, such as the use of interactive video 
Secondly, regions need to reinforce their efforts to 
develop human capabilities in two ways. First, there 
is a need to upgrade the skills and abilities within a 
region at all levels. But to be effective, these training 
measures must be of a high quality. Second, there 
is a need to improve the training of those individuals 
who will act as intermediaries or development 
agents. The latter's proactive role within a regional 
economy is, in any approach aiming to influence the 
prevailing entrepreneurial culture, one of the main 
agents of change. Their role ¡s crucial and therefore 
much greater attention needs to be given to this 
vital function. It may come from within existing inter-
mediary bodies, such as local or regional authori-
ties, or from secondment, or from consultants. 
Thirdly, the institutional framework within which poli-
cy Is designed and implemented needs to be 
decentralized, coordinated but flexible. In many 
regions, this framework may not exist and it ¡s diffi-
cult to create de novo. Attempting to replicate suc-
cesses from elsewhere dependent upon strong ins-
titutional structures may not work in certain Objec-
tive 1 regions. The shift from top-down to bottom-
up strategies within Member States may shift too 
much responsibility to local institutions which are 
inadequately equipped for the task. A major task 
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will be to ensure that an effective and decentralized 
network of regional institutions exists, particularly in 
those countries where decision-making is highly 
centralized, so that policy can be managed from the 
local level, possibly by a development agency, with 
the active participation of other relevant local actors. 
In conclusion, success in an uncertain and fast-
changing world ¡s determined by a high level of 
information, widely shared, a high level of skill 
attainment, a prevailing entrepreneurial culture, and 
a well organized institutional framework. These are 
the qualities that development policies should seek 
to promote going beyond meeting basic require-
ments for infrastructures, education and vocational 
training. What must be avoided above all Is to 
encourage a form of sheltered development isolated 
from market realities, or, worst of all, to permit by 
means of progressively greater financial transfers a 
rising standard of living despite a diminishing level of 
productive activity where this is due to an unwilling-
ness to change out-dated and inappropriate econo-
mic and social practices. 
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53.8 
34.9 
47.0 
43.0 
59.1 
72.6 
67.4 
64.4 
50.4 
77.7 
59.8 
73.4 
76.5 
69.8 
70.2 
90.4 
78.7 
73.8 
64.6 
56.7 
67.8 
74.3 
51.7 
41.0 
79.5 
34.9 
49.6 
1989-91 
change 
100 
99 
94 
89 
97 
100 
93 
99 
97 
98 
102 
98 
85 
90 
102 
101 
102 
104 
104 
105 
108 
106 
103 
108 
100 
101 
100 
99 
100 
93 
102 
101 
106 
106 
108 
102 
109 
1/ Note: These are the latest harmonized statistics provided by Eurostat. 
The figures shown In the above table (1989) will differ from the figures 
used for the original GREMÌ study, as a result of continual updating of 
GDP statistics, and the use of updated population statistics. 
The 1989 to 1991 change calculation is made on the same basis as that 
described in Annex 1 of Chapter 2. 
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